

CURRENT HISTORY

A Journal of Contemporary World Affairs



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COMING IN SEPTEMBER: CHINA

The annual Deng deathwatch is on again, and with it comes the usual questions about who will guide China into the twenty-first century. Our September issue looks at that lineup, along with a discussion of the foundations of the American-Chinese relationship and the shape of the Chinese labor force as the economy continues to expand and demand greater skills. *Articles scheduled to appear include:*

- **Who Will Lead China?**
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- **Defining Greater China**
GEORGE CRANE, WILLIAMS COLLEGE
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Prospects for Chinese Democracy
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- **Sustaining China's Development**
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"What underlying dynamics [are] eroding the long-standing patterns of world politics and fostering the evolution of new challenges to global security? How can we begin to understand the emergence of a new global order at a level more fundamental than the advent of a Mikhail Gorbachev in the Soviet Union, . . . or the sudden surge of East Germans into the West German embassy in Hungary? In short, how do we account for an acceleration of the pace of change in international affairs that has altered the very texture of history?"

Security in a Turbulent World

BY JAMES N. ROSENAU

While there is no dearth of indicators—such as the launching of wars by states and their efforts to negotiate postwar arrangements—to highlight the many ways world politics is marked by continuity, it is hardly less difficult to demonstrate that major changes have been at work in the global system, changes of sufficient magnitude to suggest the emergence of new global structures, processes, and patterns. The seemingly daily occurrence of unexpected developments and the many uncertainties that prevail in every region of the world, are so pervasive as to cast doubt on the viability of the long-established ways in which international affairs have been conducted and global security maintained. The anomalous event seems to have replaced the recurrent pattern as the central tendency of world politics.

This is not the place to enumerate the many developments that point to profound and rapid change, but it is useful to recall the utter surprise that greeted the abrupt end of the cold war. Pundits, professors,

politicians, and others conversant with world politics were literally stunned, with none claiming to have anticipated it and all admitting to ad hoc explanations. Since the sudden collapse of the communist world was the culmination of dynamics subtly at work for a long time, the intensity and breadth of the surprise it evoked can only be viewed as a measure of the extent to which our understandings of world politics have lagged behind the deep transformations that are altering the global landscape. Signs of profound change appeared well before the end of the cold war, but the series of events that transformed eastern Europe late in 1989 surely arrested attention to the presence of powerful agents of change.¹

Indeed, more than a few observers and practitioners of world politics became so sensitive to the dynamics of change that they were quick to anticipate the emergence of a new global order and to regard the 1991 Persian Gulf War as the first major expression of that order. Others have been more cautious, preferring simply to record their awe at the extent of change and to leave open how it might unfold.

What gave rise to the quickening flow of anomalies that preceded the end of the cold war and the advent of the Gulf War? What underlying dynamics were eroding the long-standing patterns of world politics and fostering the evolution of new challenges to global security? How can we begin to understand the emergence of a new global order at a level more fundamental than the advent of a Mikhail Gorbachev in the Soviet Union, the refurbishing of American military capabilities under Ronald Reagan, or the sudden surge of East Germans into the West German embassy in Hungary? In short,

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¹An extensive enumeration of the anomalies indicative of change that surfaced in the 1980s can be found in James N. Rosenau, *Turbulence in World Politics: A Theory of Change and Continuity* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990).

how do we account for an acceleration of the pace of change in international affairs that has altered the very texture of history?

A full response to these queries is offered in my *Turbulence in World Politics*, key parts of which are summarized here to suggest the sources of the turbulence that has engulfed international life and the structures and processes that are likely to emerge when the dynamics of global turbulence subside and new patterns become rooted into the ways of the world. When the fundamental patterns that normally bind and sustain international life are overcome by high degrees of complexity and dynamism—that is, when the number, density, interdependency, and volatility of the actors that occupy the global stage undergo substantial expansion—world politics can be said to have entered into a turbulent state. Lest there be any terminological confusion, however, I must stress at the outset that I use turbulence as more than a metaphor for great commotion and uncertainty. My purpose is not to wax eloquent about change, but rather to probe its underlying dynamics.

There are three primary parameters that normally sustain the global system: the distribution of power through which states, international organizations, and other key actors respond to each other (a macro parameter); the authority relationships through which governments, multinational corporations, ethnic groups, and other large collectivities are linked to individual citizens (a macro-micro parameter); and the analytical and emotional skills citizens possess and with which they respond to events (a micro parameter). All three parameters are increasing in complexity and dynamism, leading to the conclusion that the world is presently experiencing its first period of turbulence since the birth of the state system some 350 years ago. The relative simultaneity that marks the impact of much greater complexity and dynamism on all three parameters has given rise to what might well be the central characteristic of world politics today, namely, persistent tensions between tendencies toward integration and those that foster fragmentation. Viewed in this manner, it is hardly anomalous that even as Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia aspired to admission to the European Union (EU), so did their major subgroups seek to break out of their political union. As will be seen, these centralizing-decentralizing tensions are especially evident in the transformation of each of the three prime parameters.

It is important to recognize that even as individuals shape the actions and orientations of the collectivities to which they belong, so do the goals, policies, and laws of the latter shape the actions and orientations of individuals. Out of such interactions a network of causation is fashioned that is so intermeshed that it becomes extremely difficult to separate causes from effects. Indeed, the rapidity of the transformations at

work in world politics can be traced to the ways in which the changes in each parameter stimulate and reinforce the changes in the other two.

A SKILL REVOLUTION

The transformation of the micro parameter lies in the shifting capabilities of citizens everywhere. Individuals have undergone a skill revolution. For a variety of reasons—ranging from the advance of communications technology to the greater intricacies of life in an interdependent world—people have become increasingly competent in assessing where they fit in international affairs and how their behavior can be aggregated into significant collective outcomes.

Put differently, it is an error to assume that citizenries are a constant in politics—that the world has changed rapidly and complexity increased greatly without consequences for individuals everywhere. As long as people were uninvolved in and apathetic about world affairs, it made sense to look at the macro level for explanations of what happened in world politics. Today, however, the skill revolution has expanded the learning capacity of individuals, enriched their cognitive maps, and elaborated the scenarios with which they anticipate the future.

It is tempting to affirm the impact of the skill revolution by pointing to the many restless publics that have protested authoritarian rule and clamored for more democratic forms of government. While the worldwide thrust toward an expansion of political liberties and a diminution in the central control of economies is certainly linked to citizens and publics having a greater appreciation of their circumstances and rights, there is nothing inherent in the skill revolution that leads people in more democratic directions. The change in the micro parameter is not so much one of new orientations as it is an evolution of new analytical capacities. The world's peoples are not so much converging around the same values as they are sharing a greater ability to recognize and articulate their values. This change is global in scope; it enables Islamic fundamentalists, Asian peasants, and Western sophisticates alike to better serve their respective orientations. Thus the convergence of protesters in public squares has not been confined to cities in any particular region of the world. From Seoul to Prague, from Soweto to Beijing, from Paris to the West Bank, and from Belgrade to Yangon (Rangoon), the transformation of the micro parameter has been unmistakably evident.

This is not to say that people everywhere are now equal in the skills they bring to bear on world politics. Obviously, the analytically rich continue to be more skillful than the analytically poor. But while the gap between the two ends of the skill continuum may be no narrower than in the past, the advance in the competencies of those at every point on the continuum is

sufficient to contribute to a major transformation in the conduct of world affairs.

A RELOCATION OF AUTHORITY

The micro-macro parameter consists of the orientations, practices, and patterns through which citizens at the micro level are linked to their collectivities at the macro level. In effect, it encompasses the authority structures whereby large aggregations—private organizations as well as public agencies—achieve and sustain the cooperation and compliance of their memberships. Historically these authority structures have been founded on traditional criteria of legitimacy derived from constitutional and legal sources; individuals were habituated to comply with the directives issued by higher authorities. People did what they were told to do because that is what one did. As a result, authority structures remained in place for decades, even centuries, as people tended to yield unquestioningly to the dictates of governments or the leadership of any other organizations with which they were affiliated.

For a variety of reasons, including the expanded analytic skills of citizens, the foundations of this parameter have been eroded. Throughout the world today, in both public and private settings, the sources of authority have shifted from traditional to performance criteria of legitimacy. Where the structures of authority were once in place, in other words, they are now in crisis, with the readiness of individuals to comply with governing directives very much a function of their assessment of the performances of the authorities. The more the performance record is considered appropriate by individuals—in terms of satisfying needs, moving toward goals, and providing stability—the more they are likely to cooperate and comply. The less they approve of the performance record, the more they are likely to withhold their compliance or otherwise complicate the efforts of the authorities.

As a consequence of the pervasive authority crises, states and governments have become less effective in confronting challenges and implementing policies. They can still maintain public order through police powers, but their ability to address and solve substantive issues is declining as people find fault with their performances and thus question their authority, redefine the bases of their legitimacy, and withhold cooperation. Such a transformation is being played out dramatically in Russia, as it was only a few years earlier in Eastern Europe. But authority crises in the former communist world are only the more obvious instances of this newly emergent pattern. It is equally evident in every other part of the world, albeit taking different forms in different countries and among different types of private organizations. For example, in Canada the authority crisis is rooted in linguistic, cultural, and constitutional issues as Quebec seeks to secede or otherwise redefine its relationship with the central

government. In the former Yugoslavia a devolution crisis led to violence and civil war. And in those parts of the world where the shift to performance criteria of legitimacy has not resulted in the relocation of authority—such as the United States, Israel, Argentina, the Philippines, and South Korea—uneasy stalemates prevail.

Nor are global authority crises confined to states and governments. They are also manifest in subnational jurisdictions, international organizations, and nongovernmental transnational entities. Indeed, in some cases the crises unfold simultaneously at different levels. For example, when the issue of Quebec's place in Canada became paramount, the Mohawks in Quebec also pressed for their own autonomy. And among international and transnational organizations, UNESCO, the PLO, and the Roman Catholic Church have all experienced decentralizing dynamics that are at least partly rooted in the replacement of traditional with performance criteria of legitimacy.

The relocation of authority occurs in several directions. In many instances it has involved "downward" relocation toward subnational groups—ethnic minorities, local governments, single-issue organizations, religious and linguistic groupings, political factions, trade unions, and the like. In some cases the relocation process has moved "upward" toward more encompassing collectivities that transcend national boundaries. The beneficiaries of this upward relocation of authority range from supranational organizations like the EU to intergovernmental organizations such as the International Labor Organization, nongovernmental organizations like Greenpeace, professional groups such as Doctors without Borders, multinational corporations like IBM, and inchoate international social movements such as environmental or women's groups. These upward and downward relocations reinforce the tensions between the centralizing and decentralizing dynamics that underlie the turbulence presently at work in world politics.

Associated with these crises is an undermining of the principle of national sovereignty. To challenge the authority of the state and then to redirect legitimacy sentiments to supranational or subnational collectivities is to begin to deny that states have the right to resort to force. Since authority is layered such that many levels of governance may have autonomy within the jurisdictions of states, there is no one-to-one relationship between the location of authority and sovereignty. Nevertheless, trends toward the relocation of authority are bound to contribute to the erosion of sovereignty. If a state is thwarted in its efforts to mobilize effective armed forces, then sovereignty is hardly a conspicuous feature of its existence as an independent collectivity. If it cannot prevent one of its subjurisdictions from seceding, then the reach of its sovereignty is certainly reduced.

It is useful to note that sovereignty began to be undermined with its redefinition during the decolonization of the former European empires after World War II. In using self-determination as the sole criterion for statehood—irrespective of whether a former colony had the consensual foundations and resources to govern—a number of sovereign states were created, recognized, and admitted to the UN, even though they were unable to develop economically and manage their internal affairs without external assistance. Sovereignty thus often seemed to be less a source of independence than an invitation to interdependence.²

A BIFURCATION OF GLOBAL STRUCTURES

For more than three centuries the overall structure of world politics has been founded on an anarchic system of sovereign nation-states that did not have to answer to a higher authority and that managed conflict through accommodation or war. States were not the only actors on the world stage, but they were the dominant ones that set the rules. The resulting statecentric world evolved its own hierarchy based on the distribution of military, economic, and political power. Depending on how many states had the greatest concentration of power, at different historical moments the overall system was marked by hegemonic, bipolar, or multipolar structures.

Today the statecentric world no longer predominates. The skill revolution, the worldwide authority crises, and other sources of turbulence have led to its bifurcation. A complex multicentric world of diverse, relatively autonomous actors has emerged, replete with structures, processes, and rules of its own. The sovereignty-free actors of the multicentric world consist of multinational corporations, ethnic minorities, subnational governments and bureaucracies, professional societies, social movements, transnational organizations, and the like. Individually, and sometimes jointly, they compete, conflict, cooperate, or otherwise interact with the sovereignty-bound actors of the statecentric world.

In sum, while the bifurcation of world politics has not pushed states to the edge of the global stage, they are no longer the only key actors. Now they are faced with the new task of coping with disparate rivals from another world as well as the challenges posed by counterparts in their own world.

THE SOURCES OF GLOBAL TURBULENCE

Given a world with the new parametric values represented by the skill revolution, the relocation of authority, and the bifurcation of global structures, it is

hardly surprising that politicians, publics, and pundits speak of a new global order. For it is a new order, not so much because the cold war ended or because a successful coalition was mobilized to oust Iraq from Kuwait, but because the fundamental underpinnings of world politics, the parameters that sustain it, have undergone transformation.

However, while we have defined turbulence and indicated the sites at which its consequences are likely to be most extensive and enduring, a central question remains: what drives the turbulence?

Although a variety of factors have contributed to the onset of turbulence, several are especially salient. Some are external to the processes of world politics, and some are internal. Together they explain why what once seemed so anomalous now appears so patterned.

The Proliferation of Actors

The world's population exceeded 2.5 billion in 1950; it is more than 5 billion today and is projected to reach 8 billion by 2025. This demographic explosion lies at the heart of many of the world's problems and is also a source of the complexity and dynamism that has overwhelmed the parameters of the global system. Ever greater numbers of people have exerted pressure for technological innovations. They have meant larger, more articulate, and increasingly unwieldy publics. They have contributed to the unmanageability of public affairs that has weakened states, stimulated the search for more responsive collectivities, and hastened the advent of paralyzing authority crises. And the population explosion, through the sheer weight of numbers, has created new and intractable public issues, of which famines and environmental threats are only the more conspicuous examples.

But the proliferation of relevant actors is not confined to people. No less important has been the vast increase in the number and types of collective actors whose leaders can clamber onto the global stage and act on behalf of their memberships. Indeed, to note that the mounting complexity of world affairs springs in part from the deepening density of the global system is to stress not so much the unorganized complexity fostered by the population explosion as it is to refer to an organized complexity consisting of millions of factions, associations, parties, organizations, movements, and interest groups that share an aspiration to advance their welfare and a sensitivity to the ways in which a rapidly changing world may require them to network with each other.

The dizzying increase in the density of actors that sustain world politics stems from a variety of sources. In part it is a product of the trend toward ever greater specialization—the hallmark of industrial and postindustrial economies—and the greater interdependence these economies foster. In part, too, it is a consequence of widespread dissatisfaction with large-scale collectivi-

²For an extensive discussion of how the sovereignty principle was redefined, see Robert H. Jackson, *Quasi-states: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).

ties and the performance of existing authorities, a discontent that underlies the turn to less encompassing organizations that are more fully expressive of immediate needs and wants.

The Impact of Dynamic Technologies

Where population has led to the crowding of geographic space, technology has fostered the narrowing of social and political space: physical distances have been shortened, social distances have been narrowed, and economic barriers have been circumvented. And as people have thus become more interdependent, enormous consequences have followed for the skills of individuals, the conduct of their relations with higher authorities, and the viability of their collectivities. In short, it is highly doubtful whether world politics would have been overtaken by turbulence without the explosion of new technologies.

The nuclear and communications revolutions stand out as especially relevant. The extraordinary advances in military weaponry after World War II, marked by nuclear warheads and the rocketry to deliver them, reduced the probability of a major global war. The nuclear revolution thus had the ironic consequence of depriving states of the military option, one of their prime instruments for pursuing and defending their interests. To be sure, the arms race and events like the Cuban missile crisis infused the nuclear age with a high degree of volatility that often made it seem fragile. Nevertheless, even as the nuclear revolution emphasized the extraordinary capacities several states had acquired, it also pointed up the limits of state action and thereby opened the door for challenges to state authority. It is no accident that as states added substantially to their nuclear arsenals, a series of transnational, large-scale, and powerful social movements—in the realms of peace, ecology, and women's rights—acquired momentum and posed serious challenges to governments.

The communications revolution is hardly less central to global turbulence. The rapidity and clarity with which ideas and information now circulate through television, VCRs, computer networks, fax machines, satellite hookups, and fiber-optic telephone circuits have rendered national boundaries more porous and world politics more vulnerable to cascading demands. Today the whole world, its leaders and its citizenries, instantaneously share the same pictures and descriptions (albeit not necessarily the same understandings) of what is occurring in any situation.

Given the magnitude of what the communications revolution has brought about, it is hardly surprising that people everywhere have become more analytically skillful, ready to challenge authority, and more capable of engaging in collective actions to press their demands. Their information may be skewed and their understanding biased, but the stimuli to act are now

ever present. Today individuals can literally see how the participation of their counterparts elsewhere can have meaningful consequences. Likewise, the availability of high-tech communications equipment has enabled leaders in the public and private sectors to turn quickly to their memberships and mobilize them.

The Globalization of National Economies

If the communications revolution has been a prime stimulus of the tendencies toward decentralization by empowering citizens and subnational groups, the dynamics at work in economics are equally powerful as sources of centralizing tendencies. Starting in the technologically most advanced sectors of the global economy, a new kind of production organization geared to limited orders for a variety of specialized markets began to replace large plants that produced standardized goods. Consequently, businesses began to restructure capital in order to be more effective in world markets. And as capital became increasingly internationalized, so did groups of producers and plants in different countries, all of which fostered and sustained a financial system global in scope and centered in major cities such as New York, Tokyo, and Frankfurt.

In short, capital, production, labor, and markets have been globalized and are deeply enmeshed in networks of the world economy that have superseded the traditional political jurisdictions of the state. Such a transformation was bound to affect the established parameters of world politics. It has loosened the ties of producers and workers to their states, expanded the horizons within which citizens ponder their self-interests, and fostered the formation of transnational organizations. The rapid growth and maturation of the multicentric world can be traced to the extraordinary dynamism and expansion of the global economy. And so can the weakening of the state, which is no longer the manager of the national economy and has become instead an instrument for adjusting the national economy to the exigencies of an expanding world economy.

The Advent of Interdependence Issues

But the evolution of the world economy is not the only source of centralizing tendencies at work in global life. There are also a number of new transnational problems that are crowding high on the world's agenda. Where the political agendas used to consist of issues that governments could cope with on their own or through interstate bargaining, now these issues have been joined by challenges that do not fall exclusively within the jurisdiction of states and their diplomatic institutions. Six current challenges are illustrative: environmental pollution, currency crises, the drug trade, terrorism, AIDS, and the flow of refugees. Each embraces processes that involve participation by large

numbers of citizens and that inherently transgress national boundaries. The winds from the nuclear accident at Chernobyl in 1986, for example, carried radioactive pollution into many countries and had immediate and long-term effects on the people living there that made it impossible for governments to treat them as domestic problems or to address them through conventional diplomatic channels.

Since they are essentially the product of dynamic technologies and the shrinking social and geographic distances that separate people, these problems can appropriately be called "interdependence" issues. And, given their origins and scope, they can also be regarded as important centralizing dynamics in the sense that they require cooperation on a transnational scale. Each of the six issues, for instance, is the focus of either transnational social movements or ad hoc international institutions forged to ameliorate, if not to resolve, the boundary-crossing problems they have created.

The advent of interdependence issues has contributed to the present era of turbulence in world politics in several ways. First, they have given citizens pause that their states are the ultimate problem solvers and, in the case of those who join social movements, they have led people to ponder a restructuring of their loyalties. In doing so, interdependence issues have also fostered the notion that transnational cooperation can be as central to world politics as interstate conflict. Equally important, given their diffuse, boundary-crossing structure, these issues are spawning a range of transnational associations that are likely to serve as additional challenges to the authority of states.

The Weakening of States and the Restructuring of Loyalties

States have not become peripheral to global affairs; they continue to maintain their world and infuse its international system with vitality and a capacity to adapt to change. Moreover, states have been and continue to be a source of the turbulent changes that are at work. After all, it was the statecentric and not the multicentric world that created multilateral organizations, that contained the nuclear revolution, and that responded to the demands for decolonization by producing the hierarchy that has enabled the industrial countries to dominate the third world.

Accordingly, some analysts see states as increasingly robust and explicitly reject the patterns highlighted here. They see the state as so deeply ensconced in the routines and institutions of politics that the erosion of its capabilities and influence is unimaginable. The state has proved itself, the argument goes, by performing vital functions that serve the needs of people, which is why it has been around more than 300 years. During this time the state has overcome all kinds of challenges, many of which were far more severe than the globalization of national economies and the emergence of new types of collectivities. Indeed, the argument concludes,

there are many ways in which states may actually be accumulating greater capabilities.

However, it seems just as erroneous to treat states as constants as it is to view the skills of citizens as invulnerable to change. States are not eternal verities; they are as susceptible to variability as any other social system. This includes the possibility of a decline in the sovereignty principle from which they derive their legitimacy as well as an erosion of their ability to address problems.

Viewed from the perspective of vulnerabilities, the growing density of populations, the expanding complexity of the organized segments of society, the globalization of national economies, the relentless pressure of technological innovations, the challenge of subgroups intent on achieving greater autonomy, and the endless array of other intractable problems that comprise the modern political agenda, it seems evident that present circumstances lessen the capacity of states. Their agendas are expanding, but they lack the will, competence, and resources to expand correspondingly. Consequently, most states are overwhelmed to the point where effective management is largely impossible. And added to these difficulties is the fact that citizenries, through the microelectronic revolution, are continuously exposed to authority crises elsewhere in the world, scenes bound to give rise to doubts and demands in even the most stable of polities and thus to foment a greater readiness to question the legitimacy of government policies. There is considerable evidence, for example, that the collapse of East Germany in the fall of 1989 was stimulated by the televised scenes of authority being challenged in Tiananmen Square a few months earlier.

Accordingly, while states may not be about to exit from the political stage, and while they may even continue to occupy the center of the stage, they do seem likely to become increasingly vulnerable and impotent. And as ineffective managers of their own affairs, they also serve as stimuli to turbulence in world politics.

But this argument for diminished state competence is subtle and depends on many intangible processes for which solid indicators are not easily developed. Perhaps most notable in this regard are subtle shifts in loyalties that accompany the globalization of national economies, the decentralizing tendencies toward subgroup autonomy, and the emergence of performance criteria of legitimacy. Such circumstances seem bound to affect loyalty to the state. That is, as transnational and subnational actors in the multicentric world become increasingly active and effective, as they demonstrate a capacity to deal with problems that states have found intractable or beyond their competence, citizens will begin to look elsewhere than the national capital for assistance. Examples abound. Most notable recently are the difficult choices Russians have had to

make between their long-standing orientations toward Moscow and the “downward” pull of the republics or the ethnic minorities in which they are also members. With Moscow unable to provide effective leadership, and with subnational attachments being thereby heightened, individuals throughout that troubled land are facing questions about distant attachments they have long taken for granted. Chechnya is only the most recent example of this dynamic.

It would be a mistake, however, to regard the loyalty problem as confined to multiethnic systems. Relatively homogeneous societies are beset with the same dilemma, as was so clearly evident in European countries during the debates and plebiscites over whether to accept membership in the EU.

This is not to say that traditional national loyalties are being totally abandoned; such attachments do not suddenly collapse. Rather, it is only to take note of subtle processes whereby what was once well established and beyond question is now problematic and undergoing change. It seems reasonable to presume that the diminished competence of states to act decisively, combined with the processes of loyalty transformation, are rendering more complex each of the three prime parameters of world politics.

Subgroupism

Since there is a widespread inclination to refer loosely to “nationalism” as a source of the turbulent state of world politics, it is perhaps useful to be more precise about the collective nature of those decentralizing tendencies wherein individuals and groups feel readier to challenge authority and reorient their loyalties. As previously noted, the authority crises that result from such challenges can be either of an “upward” or a “downward” kind. In both kinds of relocation, the motivation that sustains them may not be so deeply emotional as to qualify as an “ism.” The creation of subnational administrative divisions, for example, can stem from efforts to rationalize the work of a government agency or private organization, and the process of implementing the decentralized arrangements can occur in the context of reasoned dialogue and calm decision making. Often, however, intense concerns and powerful attachments can accompany the press for new arrangements—feelings and commitments strong enough to justify regarding the upward relocations as evoking “transnationalism,” “supranationalism,” or “internationalism.” The downward relocations marked by comparable intensities are perhaps best labeled as “subgroupism.”

Subgroupism refers to those deep affinities people develop for the associations, organizations, and subcultures with which they have been historically, professionally, economically, socially, or politically linked and to which they attach their highest priorities. Subgroupism values the in-group over the out-group, sometimes

treating the two as adversaries and sometimes viewing them as susceptible to extensive cooperation. Subgroupism can derive from and be sustained by a variety of sources, not the least being disappointment in—and alienation from—the performance of the whole system in which the subgroup is located. Most of all, its intensities are the product of historical roots that span generations and that are reinforced by the lore surrounding past events in which the subgroup survived.

That subgroupism can be deeply implanted in the consciousness of peoples is manifestly apparent in the postcommunist resurfacing of strong ethnic identities throughout eastern Europe and Russia. There the subgroups were historic nations and the accompanying feelings can thus be readily regarded as expressions of nationalism. Not all, or even a preponderance, of these decentralizing tendencies attach to nations, however. Governmental subdivisions, political parties, labor unions, professional societies, and a host of other types of subgroups can also evoke intense attachments, and it would grossly understate the relevance of the decentralizing tendencies at work in world politics to ignore these other forms of ties. Accordingly, it seems preferable to regard the emotional dimensions of the generic decentralizing tendencies as those of subgroupism and to reserve the concept of nationalism for those subgroup expressions that revolve around nations and feelings of ethnicity.

The Spread of Hunger, Poverty, and the Third World

Underlying the bifurcation of world politics into state- and multicentric worlds has been another split—between industrially developed and underdeveloped countries—that has also contributed substantially to the onset of turbulence. The many and diverse countries of the third world have added to the complexity and dynamism of global structures; sharpened performance criteria of legitimacy; enriched the analytic skills of the underprivileged; hastened the transnationalization of economies, and social movements; limited the authority of first world states over their production facilities; intensified the flow of people from South to North; lengthened the list of interdependence issues; and strengthened tendencies toward subgroupism.

The impact of the split fostered by the breakup of Europe’s colonial empires is perhaps most obvious with respect to the global distribution of power. Decolonization not only resulted in the proliferation of actors in the statecentric world, it also infused a greater hierarchical rigidity in global structures. The process whereby ever greater power accompanied the emergence of industrial states in the first world was not matched when statehood came to Africa and Asia. As was noted earlier, the newly established states of the third world acquired sovereignty and international recognition even though they lacked the internal resources and consensual foundations to provide for

their own development, a circumstance that led the states themselves into a deep resentment over their dependence on the industrialized world for trade, technology, and many of the other prerequisites necessary to fulfill their desire for industrial development. Their sovereignty, in effect, is "negative"; it protects them against outside interference but does not empower them to address their problems successfully. The result has been a pervasive global pattern in which the industrial world has continued to prosper while the third world has languished, thus endlessly reinforcing the inequities that underlie the hierarchical structures of world politics. And having long remained at or below the poverty line, most of these quasi states have been keenly aware of the inequities and have sought vainly to overcome them.

While the quasi states legally enjoy full membership in the statecentric world, politically, socially, and economically they have had to seek assistance in the multicentric world. To cope with these bifurcated arrangements, third world states have turned both to and on various agencies of the UN. For many third-worlders the UN is an integral part of the system of domination that marks global structures; many would undoubtedly react to the proposals derived from the turbulence model for making the UN a more effective agent of change as simply more of the same—as misplaced idealism that amounts to little more than techniques for maintaining their subordination. As they see it, bifurcation means the perpetuation of hierarchy, and hierarchy means that power is continuously and relentlessly being exercised against them.

Whatever the validity of this perspective, it has also served as a source of the transformation in the macro-micro parameter. Third world resentments, the legitimacy problems of quasi states, and their attempts to use their majority in the General Assembly to alter the UN's agenda and priorities have extended and deepened the global authority crisis. Indeed, the UN has become a major site of the authority crisis as the third world has challenged the legitimacy of its actions and as the first world, fearful of dominance by the third world, has also questioned the UN's legitimacy by periodically failing to meet its financial obligations to the organization.

Even as the advent of the third world has made the hierarchical structure of the statecentric world more rigid, so has it added to the decentralizing tendencies in the multicentric world. Composed of tribes and ethnic groups artificially brought together under state banners by first world decolonizers, besieged by multinational corporations seeking to extend their opera-

tions and markets, and plagued with internal divisions and massive socioeconomic problems, third world countries have added greatly to the breadth and depth of the multicentric world. Their quasi sovereignty keeps them active in the state system, but the multicentric world has been hospitable to their fragmenting dynamics and thereby contributed to the process wherein subgroup networks are proliferating.

THE TURBULENT ORDER

Given the multiple dynamics that underlie the continuing turbulence in world politics, how can it be concluded that new global patterns—new structures of underlying order—are in the process of emerging? Is not the central tendency, rather, one in which the tensions between the forces fomenting fragmentation and those conducive to integration are being resolved in favor of the former, with the result that the world is headed toward ever greater disorder and disarray? If both cooperative and conflictful processes are unfolding throughout the world, if disquieting tendencies are at work among domestic publics even as multilateral institutions become stronger, on what basis can it be argued that the world is likely to evolve a measure of order in the years ahead? If the deterioration of societal cohesion everywhere suggests that the world is destined to experience more fragmentation—and in some instances the breakdown of civility into warfare—even as shared norms about human rights and environmental improvement become increasingly widespread and valued, how might one view the future as likely to be more orderly than unruly, as founded more on integrative than disintegrative dynamics?

My response is to suggest that the dynamics of globalization unleashed by technology are the dominant catalyst in world affairs, and the forces of subgroupism reactions thereto. Thus, in the long run the prospects for global security may not be so bleak. Global order is more an emergent pattern than a fixed arrangement. Order is slowly developing out of the ruins of the cold war, but it is not doing so with linearity or clear-cut dimensions. It is an order that expands incrementally at the margins rather than by wholesale changes at the center. It is an order that sustains both fragmentation and integration. These are not necessarily conflicting processes, but they unfold simultaneously. And when they clash, they do so in different ways at different times in different parts of the world, with the result that the prevailing global turbulence is profoundly nonlinear, uneven in its evolution, uneven in its intensity, uneven in its scope, and uneven in its direction. ■

"We are here to make a choice between the quick and the dead. . . Science has torn from nature a secret so vast in its potentialities that our minds cower from the terror it creates. Yet terror is not enough to inhibit the use of the atomic bomb. . . We must provide the mechanism to. . . preclude its use in war." Thus the sentiments from which nuclear arms control was born nearly 50 years ago. What are the prospects for arms control as the fate of one of its most important elements, the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, is decided this month?

The Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Nuclear Balance

BY JOSEPH CIRINCIONE

Its roots go back 50 years, but its future is uncertain. Inspired by Dwight D. Eisenhower, initiated by John F. Kennedy, negotiated by Lyndon B. Johnson, and signed by Richard M. Nixon, its extension now falls to Bill Clinton.

With 175 signatory nations, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, or NPT, is the sole global, legal, and diplomatic barrier to the spread of nuclear weapons. A month-long conference at the United Nations that will begin April 17 will decide how to extend the treaty—and whether it will remain viable in the face of a growing North-South divide over nuclear arsenals.

"Let us trust that we will look back," President Nixon said at the treaty's White House signing ceremony on March 5, 1970, "and say that this was one of the first and major steps in that process in which the nations of the world moved from a period of confrontation to a period of negotiation and a period of lasting peace."

In many ways it has been.

When the treaty was first negotiated, five nations had nuclear weapons—the United States, the Soviet Union, Great Britain, France, and China—and experts feared that nuclear weapons would soon spread to dozens of countries. The treaty regime stifled this threat. Today only three other countries (India, Pakistan, and Israel) have nuclear weapons, and they remain outside the treaty. Few, if any, of the non-nuclear treaty nations have even tried to build nuclear devices.

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The treaty successfully created an international standard against the spread of nuclear weapons, changing the acquisition of such weapons from a source of national pride to an object of official denial. It established the international inspection regime that helps prevent the diversion of nuclear reactor fuel to bombs. It provided the diplomatic framework that allowed Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan to give up the thousands of nuclear weapons they inherited from the former Soviet Union and to join the treaty as non-nuclear nations. It encouraged first Sweden and most recently South Africa, Argentina, and Brazil to abandon their nuclear programs and become members of either the treaty or regional nonproliferation pacts. It is the main reason the 1994 crisis over suspected North Korean nuclear activities could be resolved through inspection and negotiation rather than war.

Still, the nonproliferation regime built around the treaty has failed to match the expectations for a circumscribed nuclear future that began soon after the first atomic explosion on July 16, 1945. The echoes of those proposals still resonate in the debate over the future of the NPT.

THE FIRST TWENTY-FIVE YEARS

"I am become death," Robert Oppenheimer remarked, quoting the Bhagavad Gita's god of destruction as the first mushroom cloud boiled over the desert sands outside Alamogordo. This image of global annihilation spawned the first generation of nuclear nonproliferationists.

Europe and Asia still smoldered from the devastations of World War II. But in January 1946, the existence of even a few atomic bombs so alarmed the new United Nations General Assembly that it ordered the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC)—which it had just established—to "make specific proposals. . . for

the elimination from national armaments of atomic weapons and of all other major weapons adaptable to mass destruction. . . .”

In June 1946 the United States representative to the AEC, Bernard Baruch, presented an American plan on nuclear weapons to the commission: “We are here to make a choice between the quick and the dead. . . . Science has torn from nature a secret so vast in its potentialities that our minds cower from the terror it creates. Yet terror is not enough to inhibit the use of the atomic bomb. . . . We must provide the mechanism to assure that atomic energy is used for peaceful purposes and preclude its use in war. . . .”

The Baruch plan proposed the creation of an International Atomic Development Authority that would be entrusted with all phases of the development and use of atomic energy. Baruch urged that this authority alone possess the knowledge and control of all atomic energy activities “potentially dangerous to world security,” and the power to control, inspect, and license all other atomic activities. Once this regime was in place, he said, the United States (then the sole producer) would stop the manufacture of atomic bombs, and all existing bombs in the American arsenal would be eliminated.

Cold war suspicions and ambitions stalled any action on the proposal, but its concerns and proposed solutions reappeared in modified form in later plans. By the time President Eisenhower stepped up to the UN podium on December 8, 1953, the United States had conducted 42 test explosions, and had developed hydrogen bombs with an explosive power in the ranges of millions of tons of TNT (compared to the 12,000 to 20,000 tons of TNT the bomb dropped on Hiroshima equaled). Eisenhower explained, “A single air group, whether afloat or land-based, can now deliver to any reachable target a destructive cargo exceeding in power all the bombs that fell on Britain in all of World War II.”

The dangers of this vertical proliferation, or growth in one state’s nuclear arsenal, were matched by the dangers of horizontal proliferation once the Soviet Union and Great Britain acquired their own nuclear weapons. This meant two things, Eisenhower feared. “First, the knowledge now possessed by several nations will eventually be shared by others—possibly all others. Second, even a vast superiority in numbers of weapons. . . is no prevention, of itself, against the fearful material damage and toll of human lives that would be inflicted by surprise aggression.” Nations naturally had begun building warning and defensive systems against nuclear air attacks. But, he warned, “Let no one think that the expenditure of vast sums for weapons and systems of defense can guarantee absolute safety for the cities and citizens of any nation. The awful arithmetic of the atomic bomb does not permit of any such easy solution.”

As part of his solution, Eisenhower proposed the

creation of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which would promote the peaceful uses of atomic energy while the world’s nuclear powers “began to diminish the potential destructive power of the world’s atomic stockpiles.”

By the time the IAEA became open for membership in 1956, the disarmament components of the original vision were gone. The agency retained dual—some would say contradictory—objectives. The IAEA was directed to “accelerate and enlarge the contribution of atomic energy to peace,” and to ensure that its assistance “is not used in such a way to further any military purpose.”

John Kennedy tried—at least rhetorically—to revive efforts to eliminate nuclear weapons. On September 25, 1961, he presented to the UN a “Program for General and Complete Disarmament.” “The weapons of war must be abolished,” he said, “before they abolish us.” His ambitious plan included all the elements that negotiators still pursue today: a comprehensive nuclear test ban; a ban on the production of fissionable materials for use in weapons (plutonium and highly enriched uranium); the placement of all weapons materials under international safeguards; a ban on the transfer of nuclear weapons, their materials, or their technology; and deep reductions in existing nuclear weapons and their delivery vehicles, with the goal of eventually eliminating them.

Kennedy undoubtedly recognized the practical national and international political obstacles to such a plan. Nevertheless, the president presented a vision—part propaganda—of the world he and his country sought. “The mere existence of modern weapons—10 million times more powerful than anything the world has ever seen and only minutes away from any target on earth—is a source of horror and discord and distrust,” he said. “Men may no longer pretend that the quest for disarmament is a sign of weakness, for in a spiraling arms race a nation’s security may well be shrinking even as its arms increase.”

In 1961, Kennedy established the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) to coordinate the government’s pursuit of these goals. One of the agency’s first tasks was to begin negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union on a treaty to stop the spread of nuclear weapons. According to George Bunn, the first ACDA general counsel and a principal member of the NPT negotiating team, “The basic purpose of the NPT was to provide another choice—to establish a common nonproliferation norm that would assure cooperating nuclear weapon ‘have-not’ countries that if they did not acquire nuclear weapons, their neighbors and rivals would not do so either.”

THE SECOND TWENTY-FIVE YEARS

The resulting Non-Proliferation Treaty, with almost 100 countries as signatories, entered into force in

1970. The treaty has three basic elements. The first and most important element is spelled out in Articles I and II of the treaty. States without nuclear weapons agree not to acquire them, and those with nuclear weapons cannot transfer to anyone these weapons or control over them, or aid any nonnuclear state in the manufacture or acquisition of them. Second, an international safeguard regime is established in Articles III, IV, and V to ensure that a country can acquire the materials and technology for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, but only if it allows IAEA inspections.

Finally, in Article VI the nuclear states promise to undertake good-faith negotiations on "effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament. . ." Three of these measures are explicitly cited in the treaty's preamble: a comprehensive nuclear test ban; an end to the manufacture of nuclear weapons; and the elimination of existing nuclear weapons. A fourth is implied: refraining from the threat or use of nuclear weapons.

The remainder of the treaty consists of implementation provisions, including procedures for regular five-year reviews of the treaty's implementation and a mechanism to extend the treaty.

Unlike other major arms control and disarmament agreements, the NPT is not of indefinite duration. Both the Soviet Union and the United States wanted a permanent treaty, but they were blocked by the reluctance of Italy, Germany, Japan, and Sweden to abandon forever their nuclear options. These states had the money and the technology (and, in the case of Sweden, a nascent research program) to produce their own nuclear weapons, and they were not sure that the new alliance structures would provide for their security. Egypt, Mexico, and other nations wanted a short-term treaty as a check on the performance of the nuclear powers in implementing their Article VI commitments (which had been forced on the reluctant nuclear powers).

The resulting compromise mandates a review conference every five years, and a conference in the twenty-fifth year to decide how (not whether) to extend the treaty. It allows only three options: extend indefinitely; extend for a fixed period (after which the treaty would expire); or extend for fixed periods. A simple majority vote is required.

Time is now up. On April 17, representatives from the 175 states party to the treaty will gather in New York for the month-long conference. They will review the treaty and judge how well it has accomplished its objectives. The answers will depend on who is doing the measuring and what yardstick they use.

In the month before the conference the nuclear nations, led by the United States, mobilized to garner the necessary votes for indefinite extension. President Clinton made his first extended comment on the treaty

on March 1: "Nothing is more important to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons than extending the treaty indefinitely and unconditionally. . . The NPT is the principal reason why scores of nations do not now possess nuclear weapons; why the doomsayers were wrong. . . Failure to extend the NPT indefinitely could open the door to a world of nuclear trouble. Pariah nations with rigid ideologies and expansionist ambitions would have an easier time acquiring terrible weapons. And countries that have chosen to forego the nuclear option might rethink their decision."

Most proliferation experts agree with Clinton. However, as of April 1, a majority of the treaty members had not yet publicly declared their support for indefinite extension, meaning that the extension decision will likely remain unresolved until the final days of the conference.

THE NPT DIVIDE

The future of the treaty is no longer an East-West decision, but a North-South issue. The strongest support for indefinite extension comes from the industrialized nations, primarily the 53 members of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and the other alliance networks. With the exception of China, all nuclear states support indefinite extension. The majority of nonnuclear nations in the developing world, grouped in the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), have remained undecided up to the opening of the conference on what extension option they prefer.

There are mixed motives in this official indecision. Some states may simply be seeking to trade their vote for support in another area of concern. Many are reluctant to agree to an indefinite extension for fear of losing a lever to pry long-promised disarmament measures from the nuclear states. They say that, after 25 years, the nuclear states can still threaten to use nuclear weapons against them; they also note that nuclear tests continue, as does the production of nuclear weapons materials and nuclear missiles, submarines, and bombers. Despite several sweeping arms control treaties negotiated in recent years, the most ambitious, the second Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START II), is still not ratified. Even when implemented fully by the year 2003, there will still be almost as many nuclear weapons in the world as there were when the NPT entered into force 25 years ago. It is clear, some say, that the nuclear weapons states have not fulfilled their part of the bargain—and never will unless forced to do so by the implied threat of the collapse of the regime.

This view has been most eloquently presented by Mexico's ambassador to the Conference on Disarmament, Miguel Marín Bosch. In a speech to the conference in Geneva on January 30, he said: "Quite

obviously, with or without the cold war, the NPT's extension would hardly be an issue if we already had in place a [comprehensive test ban treaty], legally binding negative security assurances, . . . an international convention banning any further production of fissile materials for weapons purposes, and a specific post-START nuclear disarmament program. But none of this has happened and the only thing we hear are calls for an 'indefinite and unconditional extension' of a treaty which is far from perfect and is in need of a major overhaul."

Many nonaligned nations' representatives at the UN and its related organizations remember all too well the disarmament debates and declarations of the past decades. They fear that once again they will fall victim to a shell game of disappearing promises. As Marin Bosch puts it: "The relationship of the nuclear weapon states to their own nuclear weapons has not registered the kind of basic change that one might expect. They continue to rely on nuclear weapons and do not seem prepared to give them up in the foreseeable future. Quite the contrary, they are looking for ways to freeze the NPT's dichotomy between the nuclear haves and the nuclear have-nots. This does not bode well for the NPT or nuclear nonproliferation in general."

These arguments have merit. Talks on a comprehensive test ban (CTB) treaty at the Conference on Disarmament have been under way since January 1994, thanks to United States initiative. But hopes for the conclusion of a CTB treaty before the NPT conference were dashed when the conference failed to agree to a draft treaty for discussion last year. The talks this year cannot even agree on the scope of a CTB and are currently bogged down in debating details of issues such as request procedures required to trigger an on-site inspection. Meanwhile diplomats at the talks have only just agreed to a mandate for negotiations for a fissile material ban. Here the sticking point is some nations' insistence that the negotiations cover inspections of existing stockpiles, which Britain and France firmly reject.¹

While the United States and Russia have agreed under START II to reduce their strategic nuclear arsenals to 3,500 deployed warheads by the year 2003, neither the United States Senate nor the Russian Duma has ratified the agreement. When fully implemented it will be a major achievement, but could still leave the two powers with between 13,000 and 18,000 strategic and tactical nuclear warheads. Both have a total of 40,000 warheads today, compared with 38,700 in 1970. Meanwhile, the combined stockpiles of China, France, and Great Britain have grown from 400 total warheads

in 1970 to almost 1,200 today, with no plans for any reductions.

These numbers are open to interpretation. United States officials cite them as evidence that the total warheads will indeed be fewer than in 1970, that the arms race is over, and that cuts will continue. They say that although long-range (strategic) warheads deployed rose from 7,500 in 1970 to about 17,000 today, they will decline to 7,000 by the year 2003. What looks like progress from an American point of view, however, still looks like a major stockpile of nuclear bombs to a nonnuclear state.

The Clinton NPT speech also compares unfavorably to the vision of a world without nuclear weapons offered by Presidents Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Ronald Reagan. For example, a key request of the non-aligned nations has been that the nuclear weapons states simply reaffirm their commitment to the Article VI goal of nuclear disarmament. Clinton did so in a minimal, legalistic fashion: "Nuclear weapons states [in the treaty] vow not to help others obtain nuclear weapons capabilities, to facilitate the peaceful uses of atomic energy, and to pursue nuclear arms control and disarmament—commitments I strongly reaffirm. . . ." Analyst William Arkin notes that the original text of the speech distributed to reporters had in place of "disarmament" the phrase "ultimately the elimination of nuclear weapons." United States officials say this was deleted at the last minute, along with reference to new-START III talks, at the insistence of the Department of Defense. The president's speech made him appear as the spokesperson for interagency bureaucracy rather than a world leader. It did little to win votes for the NPT or inspire confidence in the postconference regime.

THIRD WORLD WARS

Some states have more ominous reasons for opposing a permanent NPT. Several, especially some populous oil countries, are motivated less by disarmament concerns than by their own nuclear ambitions. Taking up the role played 25 years ago by Italy, Germany, and others, these states are not willing to forgo forever the weapons nuclear states value so highly. Iran's major concern, for example, is not with the failure of the nuclear states to disarm, but their failure to sell Iran nuclear technology. Technically, Iran has fulfilled all treaty requirements to safeguard its desired nuclear power reactors, but United States intelligence reports are said to confirm that Iran intends to acquire the technology, knowledge, and nuclear fuel to develop its own bomb.

Others have less specific plans, but they do have dreams. Nigeria has a growing population of 90 million, substantial oil revenues, and a brutal military dictatorship. A Nigerian representative arguing against indefinite extension at an NPT-related forum this January said, "Nigeria is now a poor country. Perhaps in 25

¹The nuclear weapons states have over 1,500 tons of fissile materials in their military stockpiles. Globally, there is an additional 900 tons held by civilian nuclear reactor programs (it takes approximately 8 pounds of plutonium to make a modern nuclear weapon).

years we will be a rich country. Perhaps in 25 years we will want a bomb."

Indonesia, also an authoritarian state, is a burgeoning regional power of 200 million. It has one of the most ambitious nuclear power programs in the world, proposing to build a new reactor every two years for the next 25 years. At that time it could have all the necessary infrastructure and materials to create nuclear weapons. Indonesia has also opposed indefinite extension of the NPT.

From a certain point of view, this is not an unreasonable national security strategy. The same uncertainties cited to justify the maintenance of existing nuclear arsenals in the North seem to warrant caution in ruling out forever developing indigenous nuclear arsenals in the South. As long as Russia is concerned about the United States, China concerned about Russia, and India concerned about China, why shouldn't Indonesia be concerned about India? Or Malaysia be concerned about Indonesia?

One regional issue with the potential to disrupt the conference is the Arab-Israeli dispute. Earlier this year, Egypt began a high-profile effort to force Israel to join the NPT before it would agree to extend the pact indefinitely. An Arab League statement issued March 23 said, "Israel's refusal to join the NPT. . .represents a threat to regional security and brings into question the credibility and universality of the NPT."

Israel is believed to have 100 to 200 nuclear bombs, although it practices a policy of "nuclear ambiguity," neither denying nor acknowledging its arsenal. If a compromise is not reached in this dispute by the end of the NPT conference, it could ripple across the NAM, spoiling chances for a large majority in favor of indefinite extension. It might also result in many or most of the Middle Eastern countries voting against an extension decision they may then regard as imposed on them. The moral authority of the treaty is undoubtedly weakened under such circumstances, and enforcement of the treaty in a key region of the world could become difficult.

BREAKING THE CHAIN

There is a growing consensus among strategic experts for deep reductions in the world's nuclear arsenals and for aggressive nonproliferation measures. Some military leaders, such as Air Force General Charles A. Horner, who commanded the air forces in the Persian Gulf War, believe that the United States and Russia should have a long-term goal of eliminating all their nuclear weapons. Calling them "obsolete and unusable," Horner, then head of the United States Space Command, said, "It's kind of hard for us to say to North Korea, 'you're terrible people, you're developing a nuclear weapon,' when we have, oh, 8,000."

A group of diplomats, military officers, and defense experts chaired by General Andrew Goodpaster, former

The US-Russian Nuclear Balance

1970 Nuclear Warheads Stockpile	1995 Nuclear Warheads Stockpile	2003 Nuclear Warheads Stockpile
26,000 US	15,000 US	8,500 US
12,700 Soviet	25,000 Russian	5,000–10,000 Russian
38,700 Total	40,000 Total	13,000–18,000 Total
1970 Strategic Warheads Deployed	1995 Strategic Warheads Deployed	2003 Strategic Warheads Deployed
5,240 US	7,770 US	3,500 US
2,220 Soviet	9,300 Russian	3,500 Russian
7,460 Total	17,070 Total	7,000 Total

Uncertainty in estimates means numbers are rounded.

Sources: Arms Control Association; *The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists*, Nov./Dec. 1994 and Jan./Feb. 1995; Department of Defense.

commander of NATO and a national security adviser to President Eisenhower, recently urged a fundamental reevaluation of long-standing assumptions regarding the benefits of nuclear weapons. The group members, including former arms negotiator Paul Nitze and former Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, said, "We may well have reached the time when the costs and risks associated with weapons of mass destruction exceed their benefits to United States national security."

A prestigious bipartisan group of experts from the Council on Foreign Relations, chaired by former Bush administration Assistant Secretary of Defense Stephen Hadley, also called this year for reductions to a "radically few nuclear weapons" and for aggressive leadership to secure a CTB, a fissile material cutoff, and other nonproliferation measures. The conservative Democratic Leadership Council advised the president after the November 1994 elections to "move to a postnuclear world," arguing that "nuclear weapons are now more a liability than an asset to our nation's security," and to work for a "global grand bargain" in which the United States and the other four nuclear powers agree to reduce their stockpiles toward zero, in exchange for acceptance by "have-not" states of tougher verification and enforcement measures.

The expert opinions are backed by public opinion. A poll conducted this January found that 90 percent of the American people favor further cuts in nuclear weapon stockpiles, with 58 percent favoring the elimination of all nuclear weapons as a general goal. Over 82 percent favor a global ban on all nuclear tests. The results held true for Republican and Independent voters as well as Democrats.

THE FUTURE OF THE NPT

A successful nonproliferation strategy requires a successful NPT extension conference. All arms control and disarmament objectives are better served by a permanent Non-Proliferation Treaty. Clearly, however, the end of the cold war poses new requirements to strengthen the NPT regime. The onus will be on the five declared nuclear powers to motivate the rest to remain nonnuclear states and to strengthen the regime. The United States and Russia face a special burden of responsibility since their nuclear arsenals vastly exceed the rest. Given the chaos of Russia, the United States must set the pace in showing the international community that adequate progress is being made on the "grand bargain" struck in the NPT: nonproliferation by the many in return for nuclear disarmament by the few and access to the benefits of the peaceful use of atomic energy.

To succeed in its leadership role, the United States should have had a well-informed, well-conceived diplomatic strategy. It should have presented enough serious steps to persuade the "have-nots" that the treaty should be perpetuated. Sadly, the United States did not organize such a strategy. Despite repeated urging from nuclear proliferation experts and arms control advocates, insufficient progress was made on a number of arms control efforts in the year preceding the NPT conference. Only this January did the Clinton administration organize a high-level effort to mobilize support for indefinite extension of the treaty. And even then the endeavor consisted of an international lobby-

ing effort to win votes, not to forge a broad-based consensus.

It is likely that this effort will succeed in garnering sufficient votes for indefinite extension, since the NPT is in the direct regional interests of most states. The trick for the Northern states is to make sure the vote does not turn into a Pyrrhic victory: winning the vote only to antagonize those whose support is necessary to maintain and strengthen the nonproliferation regime. It would be disastrous if the NPT conference ends acrimoniously.

The international nonproliferation regime depends on the broad consensus of its participants. Bitterness from the NPT conference could spill over into the CTB negotiations, the fissile material cutoff negotiations, the Chemical Weapons Convention ratification process, the efforts to expand the inspections and safeguards of the IAEA, and the protocols needed to strengthen the Biological Weapons Convention. Positions could harden in any or all of these critical negotiations, setting back United States national security goals.

Finally, international events or procedural obstructionism by a determined minority could intervene to upset the voting arithmetic. For the next few months and the next few years, international nonproliferation efforts will require a deft hand and an unerring commitment. As Bernard Baruch said almost 49 years ago, "The light at the end of the tunnel is dim, but our path seems to grow brighter as we actually begin our journey. We cannot yet light the way to the end." ■

The international trade in drugs has become an increasingly important issue in global security. It is a problem, however, that falls outside traditional national security concerns, even though it threatens the political stability of many states.

Global Reach: The Threat of International Drug Trafficking

BY RENSSELAER W. LEE III

Narcotics industries rank as the world's most successful illegal enterprises, generating annual profits of roughly \$200 billion to \$300 billion. Major production and trafficking complexes in the Andes, Southwest Asia, and the Golden Triangle of Southeast Asia thrive, impervious to international enforcement programs. Indeed, between 1982 and 1994, worldwide opium production more than doubled, and the global output of coca leaves rose by 300 percent. Opium cultivation is expanding rapidly in several communist or former communist states, primarily China, Vietnam, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan. (In China, the revolutionary government claimed four decades ago that the once pervasive problem of opiate addiction was all but obliterated, but poppy plantings have been reported in at least 17 of the nation's 30 provinces, and drug use is escalating rapidly.)

China currently serves as an important transit country for Burmese heroin, and entrepreneurial North Koreans are entering the heroin business, possibly with the backing of their government. Colombia, which produces an estimated 70 to 80 percent of the world's refined cocaine, is the world's third largest opium producer, with an estimated 20,000 hectares under poppy cultivation. Moreover, the distinctive signature of Colombian-refined heroin is increasingly appearing in United States retail markets. A similar trend toward diversification in the industry is also seen in Peru, the world's largest producer of coca leaf, where low levels of poppy cultivation are being recorded. In addition, several communist or former communist countries—Poland, China, Russia, Azerbaijan, and the Baltic states—are emerging as important producers and exporters of sophisticated amphetamines. And narcot-

ics such as LSD, Ecstasy, and trimethylphenanthil (a powerful synthetic opiate) are marketed with increasing frequency in former Soviet states.

Narcotics industries are becoming larger, more powerful, and more entrenched in the global economy and in the economies and societies of individual producing states, although they differ significantly in organizational sophistication and systematic effects. For example, trafficking organizations in China are at a rudimentary stage of development, with small staffs that often disband after one or two deals. Furthermore, the profits generated by smuggling opium or heroin out of China flow primarily to overseas Chinese, not mainlanders. Consequently, Chinese drug organizations exert little influence on China's economic system and are generally not viewed as a threat to state authority. (Virtually no reports of high-level drug corruption in China have surfaced.)

At the other extreme, Colombia's highly developed trafficking enterprises employ hundreds of specialized personnel—pilots, shippers, chemists, accountants, lawyers, financial managers, and assassins—directly or on contract, and earn an estimated \$4 billion to \$7 billion annually, mainly from cocaine sales in the United States and Europe. These revenues endow the narcotraffickers with a significant capability to bribe or otherwise influence the behavior of key Colombian officials and political leaders. (United States law enforcement officials estimate that the Colombian cartels spend more than \$100 million annually on bribes in the country.) Colombia constitutes a model of advanced or mature narcotics enterprises that have the economic and political problems associated with a large criminal sector.

Some worrisome trends have arisen in narcotic industry strategies: widening economic influence, that is, the impact of the illicit drug trade on illegal economic structures and processes in major producing or transit countries; the increasing political corruption in such countries; the growing intrusion of narcocriminal enterprises into the realm of the state and the law, a

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process that some scholars associate with the delegitimation of government; the successes of narcotics businesses in innovation, avoiding detection, and increasing operating efficiency; and, especially apparent since the late 1980s, the growing transnational cooperation among criminal empires that deal in drugs and other black market items. All these trends suggest that narcotics industries are enhancing their power and reach, developing new and advanced capabilities, and establishing new bases of support. At the same time, the leaders and citizens of some trafficking countries are exhibiting clear signs of drug war fatigue. Much to the dismay of the United States, support is growing for peaceful resolutions of the drug trade issue, ranging from negotiated surrenders that treat drug kingpins leniently to the outright legalization of narcotics.

DRUG ECONOMICS

The economic effects of the drug trade stem mainly from the processes of legitimizing narcotics earnings in the country or countries of origin. Different nations display different patterns. For example, officials in the Chinese Ministry of Public Security believe that opium and heroin smugglers invest few of their earnings in ventures that benefit the Chinese economy. Most drug proceeds are banked in noncommunist Asian countries and the little money that does return to the country tends to be used to buy luxury housing, furniture, electronic equipment, and gold jewelry. In Russia the sales of illicit drugs total an estimated \$800 million each year, and law enforcement officials contend that much of the startup capital for small, legitimate businesses, such as stores, restaurants, and fruit stands, is supplied by the narcotics trade. (However, the economic effect of drugs in Russia is difficult to separate from the effect of organized crime groups in general, which operate many profitable illegal enterprises.) Colombia is probably suffering from the most advanced case of narcoeconomic penetration; traffickers annually repatriate an estimated \$2 billion to \$5 billion from narcotics exports, or approximately 4 to 9 percent of Colombia's GDP of \$55 billion. One Colombian economist, Francesco Thoumi, has calculated that accumulated trafficker assets in Colombia and abroad reached anywhere from \$39 billion to \$66 billion between 1989 and 1990, a scale of narcowealth so immense that it could easily alter Colombia's economic and political status quo.

Indeed, drug money pervades the Colombian economy. For example, according to the Colombian Institute of Agrarian Reform and the Colombian Farmers Association, drug dealers expanded their direct or intermediary ownership of agricultural land from 1 million hectares in the late 1980s to an estimated 4 million hectares in 1994. Today, traffickers own or control between 8 and 11 percent of agriculturally usable land in at least 250 of 1,060 Colombian

municipalities, making them a powerful force in the rural Colombian economy. Technological improvements in cattle raising and commercial agriculture sometimes accompanied narco land investments, strengthening traffickers as rural leaders in some areas. Furthermore, as the so-called Cali cartel gained ascendancy, the infiltration of legitimate businesses by drug dealers reached significant new levels. Earlier generations of traffickers, such as the leaders of the Medellín cartel of the 1980s (then the dominant trafficking group in Colombia), were relatively unsophisticated economic actors who were more concerned with laundering drug earnings than realizing adequate returns on their investments. However, these earlier traffickers clearly spent to enhance their status. Conspicuous examples abound. Jose Gonzalo Rodriguez Gacha accumulated 140 country estates, collectively worth an estimated \$100 million; some of these residences were lavishly furnished with items such as pillows stuffed with ostrich feathers, gold-plated bathroom fixtures, and imported Italian toilet paper stamped with likenesses of Botticelli's *The Birth of Venus*.

In contrast, the Cali group cultivated an image of business respectability by investing in a wide range of economic activities. According to a recent report by the Colombian Department of Administrative Security, Cali drug money has "infiltrated the construction industry, drugstore chains, radio stations, automobile dealerships, department stores, factories, banks, sports clubs, and investment firms." Agribusiness enterprises such as cut flowers, tropical fruit production, and poultry farms can be added to this list. "In what sectors of the economy has the Cali cartel not invested?" asked Gabriel de Vega Pinzon, the head of the Colombian National Drug Directorate, in a December 1994 interview with this writer.

DRUG POLITICS

Drug trafficking also has wide-ranging effects on political and administrative systems in developing countries. Narcotics industries in countries such as Myanmar, Afghanistan, and Colombia (especially between 1989 and 1991) are associated with extreme antistate violence or with the disintegration of national authority. However, most drug dealers are not pursuing independent political initiatives, preferring to coexist with and manipulate the state authority. "We don't kill judges or ministers, we buy them," remarked Cali cartel leader Gilberto Rodriguez Orejuela on one occasion. Indeed, corruption has assumed outlandish proportions in Colombia. In 1994 police and judicial investigations detected evidence of trafficker payoffs to: a former president of the Colombian national congress, a former comptroller general, a recently elected congressman, 12 retired army officers (communication and security specialists "decorated for their outstanding service to the army"), more than 150 Cali police

officers, almost the entire contingent of Cali airport police, employees of the El Valle telephone system, the Cali regional prosecutor, 6 of 22 Cali city councillors, and the mayors of 4 Colombian cities, among them Medellín.

The pattern of corruption in Latin America also includes attempts by traffickers to purchase influence at the highest political levels. During the 1980s, narcocorruption involving top national leaders or their closest associates was documented in Bolivia, Panama, the Bahamas, and the Turks and Caicos Islands. One drug informant claims that Fidel Castro's brother Raúl personally authorized the shipment of 6 tons of cocaine through Cuba between 1987 and 1989. Traffickers have also indirectly sought political leverage by contributing to presidential election campaigns. Trafficker support of the 1989 Bolivian campaign of President Jaime Paz Zamora prompted Paz in 1991 to appoint a known drug dealer, Faustino Rico Toro, to head the Bolivian Special Narcotics Force, although pressure from the United States subsequently forced Paz to dismiss Rico Toro from that post; in early 1995 the Bolivian Supreme Court authorized the extradition of Rico Toro to the United States on drug charges. In Colombia a major scandal erupted in June 1994 when a taped telephone conversation leaked to the press showed Gilberto Rodríguez Orejuela and his brother discussing a possible donation of \$3.8 million to the presidential campaign of Ernesto Samper Pizano. Some Colombian and United States observers—among them Jose Toft, the United States Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) representative in Colombia at the time—contend that the Samper campaign did in fact receive millions of dollars from the Cali cartel. Toft, who resigned from the DEA last September, summarized a widely held belief about the state of Colombian politics when he commented to a Colombian television news station that, "I cannot think of a single political or judicial institution that has not been penetrated by the narco-traffickers—I know that people don't like to hear the term 'narcodemocracy,' but the truth is it's very real and it's here."

Modern narcotics enterprises have also helped criminal authority grow at the expense of legitimate state authority. In Latin America this encroachment spans issues such as social welfare, counterinsurgency, and (ironically) the maintenance of law and order. For example, in Mexico, Colombia, and Bolivia, traffickers have cultivated a Robin Hood image by devoting vast resources to community development projects such as roads, schools, airport repairs, and housing, or by donating money and gifts to the poor. Such activities cemented political support for the drug capos among marginalized social groups such as Medellín slum dwellers and poor farmers in the Bolivian Beni—populations that governments and legitimate nongovernment organizations cannot serve. In Colombia a weak government presence in the countryside, an

ongoing rural insurgency, and the acquisition of landed estates by drug lords in the 1980s created new political opportunities and roles for narcotics dealers. For example, paramilitary organizations financed by trafficking interests emerged, supplanting an impotent Colombian state by furnishing local security against predatory guerrilla groups. Curbed somewhat by the Colombian government's 1990 crackdown on the Medellín cartel, narco-backed paramilitaries nonetheless pursue their mission in the middle Magdalena Valley, Córdoba, Urabá, and other guerrilla-infested regions. (Of course, paramilitary operations to root out and exterminate leftist guerrilla sympathizers pose serious human rights challenges for Colombia.) Legitimate private groups conducting business in the Colombian hinterlands—coffee growers, cattlemen associations, and foreign oil companies, for example—admittedly provide public welfare and security protection functions. However, the assumption of such roles by the narcotraffickers generates particularly ominous overtones for the Colombian political process.

Traffickers tend to support their local police on law and order issues such as the defense of property rights and maintenance of basic community services; police who spearhead government narcotics crackdowns or work for rival trafficking organizations, however, stand a good chance of being murdered. The Cali cartel supported a perverted and socially regressive form of law enforcement, the so-called social cleansing groups, which targeted marginal urban dwellers such as prostitutes, thieves, beggars and drug addicts. In some regions of Latin America and Asia, trafficking interests for all practical purposes are the law, since the government does not exercise real sovereignty in those areas. (Drug trafficker Khun Sa's Shan state enclave in Myanmar represents perhaps the most egregious modern example of narcowarlordism.) Yet, opportunistic traffickers also assist or form alliances with governments that persecute rival criminal organizations. For example, in Myanmar, the Wa insurgent trafficking groups are enlisting government help to fight Khun Sa's Shan United Army—and managing to broaden their territorial base in the process.

In Colombia the Cali cartel found it politically and commercially expedient to furnish "valuable information" to the government for its ultimately successful manhunt for Pablo Escobar and some of his lieutenants, a contribution recently acknowledged by Colombian prosecutor general Alfonso Valdivieso (according to the Cali regional prosecutor's office, the Cali group hired Japanese communication experts to track Escobar's movements in the months before his demise). Moreover, in a June 1994 interview with this writer, Valdivieso's predecessor, Gustavo de Grieff, referred to a report that a special government search force in Medellín received a \$10 million payment from Cali traffickers shortly after Escobar was killed last Decem-

ber and allegedly distributed the funds among ranking members of the force. "Apparently, [the force] was an instrument of Escobar's enemies, not of the government," de Grieff commented.

Such scattered examples confirm the ability of traffickers, who command enormous power and resources, to pirate government functions or inherit them by default. In surrender negotiations with the Colombian government, the Cali traffickers surprised no one by wielding their contributions to the anti-Escobar campaign as leverage against the government. In a letter to President Cesar Gaviria in January 1994, Gilberto Rodriguez Orejuela petitioned for house arrest rather than a jail cell, in part on grounds of his "collaboration with the prosecutor general's office and the search group to achieve the well-known results."

Finally, new patterns of domestic and international cooperation have spawned among criminal empires that deal in illicit drugs. Such cooperation connects criminal groups such as the Colombian cartels, Mexican smuggling organizations, Japanese *yakuza*, Hong Kong Chinese syndicates, Sicilian mafia, and Russian organized crime. Central issues of common concern include the organization of markets, trade deals (for example, exchanges of drugs for weapons, drugs for cash, and drugs for drugs), smuggling logistics, and laundering or repatriation of trafficking proceeds.

Cooperation between Colombian traffickers and Italian organized crime groups to sell cocaine in Italy and the rest of Europe apparently stands at a particularly advanced stage. The Cali cartel and the Sicilian mafia are experimenting with franchise arrangements that would allow the mafia to distribute large consignments of Cali cocaine to European buyers outside Italy. The Cali group has also established working relationships with organized crime figures in Poland, the Czech Republic, and Russia. The Cali traffickers' strategic design uses these countries as a back door to deliver cocaine to western Europe. Such relationships are underscored by Russian government seizures of 1.1 tons of cocaine in Vyborg in February 1993, and 400 kilograms of the drug in St. Petersburg in April 1994; both shipments could be traced to Cali trafficking organizations. In general, international narcocooperation opens new markets for narcotics and other illegal products, exploits economies of scale for selling in those markets, enhances organized crime's penetration of legal economic and financial systems, and generally increases the power of criminal formations relative to national governments.

TREATING THE DRUG PROBLEM

Confronting powerful narcotics lobbies and publics weary of drug wars, government commitment to suppress narcotrafficking is waning perceptibly in some source countries. One manifestation of this trend is rising political support to legalize drugs. Bolivia's

president, Gonzalo Sanchez de Losada, openly favors this; he declared to a Spanish newspaper in 1993 that "The antidrug fight is the politician's tomb—prohibition has achieved nothing but making vices extremely profitable for traffickers. It is terrible to say it, but some tax on drugs should be created." The Bolivian government promised coca farmers in September 1994 that it would mount an international campaign to decriminalize the coca leaf (but not the products derived from it). Colombian President Ernesto Samper recently canceled plans for a popular referendum to overturn a May 1994 decision by the Colombian constitutional court that legalized personal drug use.

The legalization or selective decriminalization of drugs is gaining ground elsewhere in the world. Poland, Russia, and Italy have lifted criminal penalties for personal drug use, and cannabis products are openly sold to adults in coffeehouses in the Netherlands. In China, where drug dealers are routinely executed with great public fanfare, some local cadres advocate removing restrictions on poppy growing to help isolated mountain areas "get rid of poverty"—possibly a sign of the significant proportions of the private opium trade in that country.

In the Andean countries, governments have not legalized drug production—an action that would spur certain retaliation by the United States—but they have attempted to diminish conflicts with the cocaine industry by negotiating with participants and leaders in the trafficking chain. Colombia's negotiations with Medellín cartel leaders date to May 1984, when former President Alfonso Lopez Michelson and Attorney General Carlos Jimenez Gomez held separate meetings with Pablo Escobar and other kingpins in Panama. Since 1990, Colombia has offered reduced sentences and other legal inducements to traffickers who surrender, confess, and turn state's evidence.

Colombian officials see negotiations as a tool of social policy that can subdue the power of individual trafficking organizations. Negotiations doubtless helped reduce narcoterrorist violence in the 1990s, but produced few successes against cocaine trafficking. Important traffickers negotiated relatively short sentences that ranged from 4 to 8 years, but furnished little information on the workings of cocaine enterprises. Ivan Urdinola, for example, refused to name major accomplices, averring that such disclosures would place him in mortal danger, and liberally laced his confessions with fatuous statements. (At one point, he informed a judge, "Aside from being a drug trafficker, I am an admirable person."): Perhaps the late Pablo Escobar abused the surrender policy most notoriously. After negotiating a deal with the government in mid-1991, Escobar was incarcerated in the La Catedral prison near Medellín, where he continued to manage his cocaine business until his escape 13 months later. (Subsequent revelations indicated that Escobar paid \$2

million for construction of the facility, which was equipped with cellular telephones, fax machines, and computers.) In Bolivia, the government's repentance program produced similarly disappointing results. Repenters characterized themselves as simple cattle farmers who only dabbled in cocaine or lent money to traffickers; the three most important traffickers who surrendered under the Bolivian program received sentences of only 4 to 6 years.

Cali cartel leaders recently offered to implement a plan that would reduce cocaine exports from Colombia by 60 percent (their estimate of their share of the business) if they spent little or no time in jail. Of course, such an offer invites skepticism, since the Cali dons might not control or directly influence a sufficiently large percentage of Colombian refining and exporting capacity to fulfill such a commitment. Recent information suggests that the Colombian cocaine industry is more decentralized and balkanized than during the 1980s. Gilberto Rodríguez Orejuela himself noted in a November 1994 letter to *El Tiempo* that "there are many cartels"; moreover, the industry depends on a multitude of subcontractors and freelancers. Of course, drug kingpins possess considerable leverage over lower level operators; they can stop purchasing products and services or simply withhold protection from laboratories, transport companies, distribution cells, laundering operations, and other key trafficking entities. But, in putting forth their offer, the Cali traffickers provided no blueprint or timetable for dismantling their multibillion-dollar enterprises. Also, a number of factors—the size of the illicit drug industry, the prevalence of official corruption, and the weakness of the Colombian criminal justice and judicial institutions—indicate that Colombia could not successfully implement such a deal.

Debates over legalization, democratization, and negotiated accords with traffickers in key source countries have produced consternation in Washington. Yet, disillusionment with overseas narcotics control and with drug prohibition in general is also widespread in the United States. Many Americans favor scrapping supply-side programs altogether, shifting resources to education and prevention programs, or even legalizing the production and use of some drugs. United States international initiatives, including the roughly \$1 billion allocated to counternarcotics operations in the Andes since 1989, certainly have had few long-term effects on the availability or purity of drugs in America's major urban markets. Some United States policies are wasteful, counterproductive, or worse. For example, the Bolivian government spent \$48.1 million in American aid between 1987 and 1993 to pay farmers to eradicate 26,000 hectares of coca. Farmers, however, planted more than 35,000 new hectares of coca during the same period. The planned compensation for eradication transformed into little more than a coca support program.

At least in the short term, the objective of restricting internationally the suppliers of illegal drugs is probably not attainable. The number of potential drug suppliers is virtually unlimited; few geographical, organizational, or technological barriers obstruct entry into narcotics industries, and crops, laboratories, drug shipments, planes, money, chemicals, and routes can be easily replaced if destroyed. Of course, the value of international drug control does not necessarily lie solely in controlling narcotics. The war on narcotrafficking can be justified as a moral imperative even if it is a practical failure. Furthermore, the United States has staked its prestige and predicated its diplomatic relations with several countries on combating the drug scourge.

More important, however, is the fact that enterprises such as the Colombian cartels and counterpart groups in Europe and Asia dangerously aggregate power that can destabilize governments and facilitate global breakdowns in law and order. (For example, some United States intelligence officials believe that drug-trafficking networks and routes can be easily reconfigured to smuggle chemical weapons, plutonium, or tactical nuclear weapons to terrorist nations and groups.) Demolishing such power can stand alone as a worthwhile objective. Similarly, United States policy expresses legitimate concerns when helping governments curb the political and economic reach of the drug lords, contain narcoterrorist violence, and in general cope with the divisive effects of the drug business. Between 1989 and 1993, the United States supported a crackdown on the Medellín cartel that decimated the group's leadership (all the Medellín founding fathers are either dead or in jail) and removed a lethal threat to the Colombian political order. American pressure or intervention prompted the ouster of narcotics-linked military regimes in Bolivia in 1980 and 1981, and in Panama in 1989, two countries where narcotics trafficking interests had built cozy relationships with the military, giving them *de facto* control of the national government apparatus for controlling drug crime. In Bolivia, United States pressure on the Paz administration in 1991 prevented the appointment of Bolivians apparently linked to the cocaine trade to head the Ministry of Interior, the National Police, and the Special Narcotics Force.

In a number of countries—such as Bolivia, Thailand, and Laos—United States foreign assistance has fostered positive economic growth, widened income opportunities for farmers who cultivate drugs, and weakened the relative economic clout of narcotics industries. Perhaps international drug policy cannot substantially control entrenched drug trafficking, but supply-side programs can be reconfigured to target criminal organizations, promote stability and growth in drug-torn countries, and enhance positive United States influence. ■

"Progress toward the objective of a more pluralist world system requires that the international community accept a common obligation to protect collective rights within such an emergent system. . . . The counterpart . . . is the obligation not to impose cultural standards or political agendas on other peoples. This applies with special force to situations in which the international community supports the establishment of new states as a way of resolving conflicts within multiethnic societies, as in the former Yugoslavia."

Communal Conflicts and Global Security

BY TED ROBERT GURR

Since the end of the cold war, conflicts between communal groups and states have been recognized as the major challenges to domestic and international security in most parts of the world. Minority peoples also are now the principal victims of gross human rights violations. In 1993 more than 25 million refugees were fleeing from communal conflicts, including 3 percent of the population of sub-Saharan Africa. Communal conflict has devastated the former Yugoslavia and East-Central Africa, and threatens the stability of most of the former republics of the Soviet Union. This century's longest conflicts are still being fought over ethnonational issues in the Middle East and Southeast Asia. Communal conflict is also ascendant in the West: ethnic tensions and inequalities drive the most divisive conflicts in the United States in the 1990s, and Quebec is edging toward secession from Canada. Virtually every country in western Europe is beset by growing public antagonism toward immigrant groups of third world origin.

Before now, there was no firm basis for generalizing about the nature of communal conflicts beyond the groups or region examined in specific case studies. However, the Minorities at Risk project, an ongoing

study of the status, demands, and conflicts of virtually all politically active communal groups throughout the world during the 1980s and 1990s, has found that some generalizations can be made.¹

The 292 communal groups that this study examines differ widely in their defining traits, political status, and aspirations. Many of the comparisons that follow distinguish between national peoples and minority peoples. National peoples are regionally concentrated groups that have lost their autonomy to expansionist states but still preserve culturally distinct features and desire some degree of political separation. Minority peoples, by contrast, have a defined socioeconomic or political status within a larger society—based on some combination of their ethnicity, immigrant origin, economic roles, and religion—and are concerned about protecting or improving that status. The table on page 213 makes distinctions between these two general types.

Global analysis suggests answers to 11 general questions about politically active communal groups.

1. What proportion of the world's population identifies with politically assertive communal groups? Where are they most numerous?

In 1994 about one-sixth the global population (989 million people) belonged to 292 groups whose members either have experienced systematic discrimination or have taken political action to assert their collective interests against the states that claim to govern them. Not everyone in each group agrees about their common identities and interests; most minorities are divided by crosscutting loyalties to different clans, localities, classes, or political movements. Therefore the aggregate numbers represent the outer bounds of the populations that might be mobilized for collective action on behalf of communal interests. Shared adversity and conflict with dominant groups almost invari-

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¹This article is a revision of chapter 11 in Ted Robert Gurr, with Barbara Harff, Monty G. Marshall, and James R. Scarritt, *Minorities at Risk: A Global View of Ethnopolitical Conflicts* (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1993). It incorporates updated information from the 1990s phase of the Minorities at Risk project, funded by the National Science Foundation, the United States Institute of Peace, and the Korea Foundation.

Types of Politically Active Communal Groups

National Peoples:

Ethnonationalists	Large, regionally concentrated peoples with a history of organized political autonomy who have pursued separatist objectives at some time during the last 50 years.
Indigenous peoples	Conquered descendants of the original inhabitants of a region who typically live in peripheral regions, practice subsistence agriculture or herding, and have cultures sharply distinct from dominant groups.

Minority Peoples:

Ethnoclasses	Ethnically or culturally distinct peoples, usually descended from slaves or immigrants, with special economic roles, usually of low status.
Militant sects	Communal groups whose political status and activities are centered on the defense of their religious beliefs.
Communal contenders	Culturally distinct peoples, tribes, or clans in heterogeneous societies who hold or seek a share in state power.

ably sharpen the sense of common interest and build support for political action.

Of the world's 190 countries, 120 have politically significant minorities.² The table on page 214 shows that sub-Saharan Africa has the greatest concentration of minorities at risk—81 groups whose people constitute more than 50 percent of the regional population. Before the breakup of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, eastern Europe had the second largest percentage of minorities at 35 percent. However, while the number of politically salient minorities in the region has nearly doubled, from 32 to 59, they comprise only 14 percent of the region's total population. Asia, Latin America, and the Western democracies have had the smallest proportions, between 11 percent and 13 percent each.

2. Which communal minorities in which world regions are most seriously disadvantaged?

Ethnoclasses, such as Maghrebins in France, people of color in the Americas, and immigrant Chinese communities in Asian countries, experience on average greater political and economic inequalities and discrimination than other groups. Indigenous peoples face disadvantages nearly as great, and are threatened by severe ecological pressures on their traditional lands and resources as well. Ethnonationalists and communal contenders are less likely to be economically disadvantaged than other types of groups, but they usually face substantial political restrictions, often

because their political aspirations are seen as a threat by state elites.

At the end of the 1980s, inequalities and discriminatory barriers overall were markedly lower in eastern Europe, the Soviet Union, and the industrial democracies than in other world regions. But in the 1990s most Soviet successor states have imposed discriminatory restrictions on nontitular nationalities, erasing most of the Soviet regime's socially engineered equality of status and opportunity for national minorities. The rump Yugoslavia, Croatia, and Romania also pursue discriminatory policies toward national minorities; most other eastern and central European states have followed the Western democratic precedent.

In Africa and Asia, inequalities and discrimination against communal minorities have remained relatively high, though the new Asian democracies have been notably successful in reducing historical patterns of discrimination.³ Indigenous and Afro-American minorities in Latin America, though proportionally small in numbers, experienced the greatest economic differentials and most severe economic discrimination observed in any world region. Communal minorities in the Middle East and North Africa have been subject to the most severe political restrictions.

3. Are ethnopolitical grievances and demands mainly the result of inequalities and discrimination?

Two different dynamics underlie the demands and strategies of activist communal groups. First, contemporary movements for secession or regional autonomy are strongly motivated by a desire to protect and assert group identity. These autonomy demands are concentrated among ethnonationalists and indigenous peoples with a tradition of political independence and sharp cultural differences from dominant groups. The second dynamic is that ethnoclasses, communal contenders, and militant sects usually have more tangible concerns. Their strongest demands are for greater rights within societies, not a desire to exit from them. Discrimination motivates demands for greater political and eco-

²The study excludes countries with 1994 populations of less than 500,000. A handful also have politically salient minorities, so our count is slightly understated. Also excluded are immigrant workers and refugees, unless and until they become permanent residents in the host country, as has happened with Palestinians in Lebanon and Turks in Germany.

³Ted Robert Gurr, "Democracy and the Rights of Ethnic and Regional Minorities in Asia" (Paper presented to the thirteenth International Conference of the Korean Association of International Studies, Seoul, October 1994).

Minorities at Risk in 1994, by Region				
World Region	Number of Countries with Minorities at Risk	Number of Minorities at Risk	Population of Minorities (1994 Estimates)	
			Total	Percent of Regional Population
Western democracies and Japan (28 countries)	15	31	94,291,000	12
Eastern Europe and Soviet successor states (27 countries)	25	59	59,671,000	14
East, Southeast and South Asia (34 countries)	21	62	397,474,000	13
North Africa and the Middle East (19 countries)	11	27	89,840,000	26
Africa south of the Sahara (48 countries)	30	81	294,460,000	51
Latin America and the Caribbean (34 countries)	18	32	52,965,000	11
Total (190 countries)	120	292	988,701,000	18

conomic rights, while cultural differences prompt demands for protection of the group's social and cultural rights.

4. How much has ethno-political conflict increased?

Every form of ethno-political conflict increased sharply from the 1950s through the early 1990s. Nonviolent political action by communal groups more than doubled between 1950 and 1990, and both violent protest and rebellion quadrupled. Trends differ widely among regions and types of groups, however. In the democracies communal conflict peaked in the early 1970s and declined through the end of the 1980s. In contrast, ethnic protest and rebellion in eastern Europe and the Soviet Union were low for most of the postwar period but began to escalate in the early 1980s, even before perestroika and glasnost. Nonviolent protest and rebellion steadily increased in Asia and the Middle East from the 1950s onward. The decline of some communal conflicts in these regions since 1990—for example by the Kurds and non-Burmese nationalists in Myanmar—have been offset by intensified communal conflicts in India, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. Communal conflict in Africa was shaped by decolonization and its consequences. Protest reached a peak in the decade before 1960, when most African countries gained independence, but since then a pronounced shift from protest to rebellion has occurred. Africa now has the most intense ethno-political conflicts of any world

region.⁴ Latin America has the lowest levels of communal conflict. Disputes there are mainly nonviolent protest by indigenous activists that reached a climacteric in the late 1970s and early 1980s; since 1990, however, there has been a fresh upsurge of activism among indigenous Latin Americans.

Worldwide comparisons show that indigenous groups have seen the greatest proportional increase in conflict, a testimony to the influence of the global indigenous rights movement that was established in the 1970s. The long-term global increase in rebellion is mainly attributable to autonomy movements by ethnonationalists, whose magnitudes of rebellion increased fivefold between the early 1950s and the 1980s. Communal contenders, a group type found mainly in sub-Saharan Africa, have shifted from nonviolent protest to rebellion. Ethnoclasses, most of whom live in Western democracies and Latin America, have mainly relied on nonviolent protest; this escalated into sporadic episodes of rioting and terrorism from the late 1960s to the early 1980s.

5. How serious is religiously based communal conflict?

Religious cleavages are usually a contributing factor in communal conflict but seldom the root cause. Only 8 of the 49 militant sects in the study are defined solely or mainly by their religious beliefs. An example of these are the politically mobilized Shiite communities in Iraq and Lebanon, whose goals are political rights and recognition, not the propagation of their faith. Other sectarian minorities also have class identifications, such as the Catholics of Northern Ireland and Turkish immigrants in Germany, or nationalist objectives, such as the Palestinians in Israel's occupied territories and

⁴Detailed regional comparisons of ethno-political rebellions are summarized in Ted Robert Gurr, "Peoples Against States: Ethno-political Conflict and the Changing World System," *International Studies Quarterly*, September 1994.

the Moros in the Philippines. The driving force behind the most serious and protracted communal conflicts in the Middle East is not militant Islam but the unsatisfied nationalist aspirations of the Kurds and Palestinians.

Religiously inspired political conflict was uncommon anywhere in the world until the 1960s. It doubled in magnitude from then through the end of the 1980s, but its rate of increase was outpaced by rebellion by other kinds of groups, especially ethnonationalists. Overall, groups defined wholly or partly by sectarian differences from dominant groups accounted for one-quarter of rebellions in the 1980s.

6. Is the trend in ethnopolitical activism moving toward protest or rebellion?

Since 1945, nonviolent political action has been far more common among minorities in Western societies, including Latin America, than violent ethnopolitical protest and rebellion. This was also the case in eastern Europe and the Soviet Union until 1990. Deadly communal conflicts in the former Yugoslavia and the Caucasus distract attention from a significantly larger phenomenon: the breakup of the Soviet Union into 15 independent countries was accomplished without protracted civil wars or communal rebellions. Ethnic relations in most of the new countries are thus far fractious but seldom deadly; the exceptions have been Moldova, Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Tajikistan. Communal conflicts in the first three were in remission in early 1995; Tajikistan's civil war is a consequence of political rivalries, not communal ones.

The protagonists in the most persistent communal rebellions of the last 50 years have been ethnonationalists such as the Tibetans, the Eritreans, southern Sudanese, the Palestinians, the Kurds, the Basques, the Karen and Kachin in Burma, and the Nagas and Tripuras in India. Eighty guerrilla and civil wars were fought by these and other communal rebels between 1945 and 1989: 26 were in Asia, 25 in sub-Saharan Africa, 22 in the Middle East and North Africa, 4 in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, and 2 in Latin America. A look at 33 ethnopolitical wars and militarized conflicts in 1993–1994 shows proportional increases in sub-Saharan Africa and the former Soviet sphere, but declines elsewhere. Twelve of the 33 were in sub-Saharan Africa, 7 in eastern Europe and the Soviet successor states, 9 in Asia, 3 in the Middle East and North Africa, and 2 in Latin America.

7. Do reformist responses to ethnic demands lead toward accommodation or escalation of communal conflict?

Most communal conflicts begin with acts of protest that escalate into violent conflict. In authoritarian, third world regimes the escalation usually happens very quickly, in part because official responses are more likely to be repressive than reformist. In democracies, however, escalation to violence is usually limited

and based on the actions of small, militant factions. All 24 minorities in the Western democracies and Japan used nonviolent political tactics at some time between 1945 and 1989; half resorted to violent protest, and half had militant factions that engaged in terrorism. Setting aside two movements that used violence from the onset (the Irish Republican Army and Puerto Rican nationalist groups), an average of 13 years elapsed between the establishment of political movements representing communal interests in the Western democracies and the first occurrence of violence. This gave societies ample time to respond to communal grievances while conflict was muted. Moreover, the fact that most democratic regimes have attempted reforms helps explain why communal violence in Western societies, once it did occur, is usually limited.

8. Does regional autonomy lead to escalating wars of independence?

Ethnonationalist civil wars have been the most protracted and deadly conflicts of the late twentieth century. They are fought with great intensity because communal demands for independence imply the breakup of existing states. Until the Soviet Union's dissolution, the only ethnonationalists since 1945 who had won independence from existing states were the Bangladeshis, whose independence was bought at the price of political mass murder and India's intervention. Since then a revolutionary coalition has overthrown the Ethiopian regime, which paved the way for Eritrean independence.

Many political leaders on both sides of such struggles have been willing to consider autonomy arrangements that do not grant total independence. When the outcomes of 28 civil wars fought since 1950 in which one of the protagonists sought independence or autonomy are compared, the ledger is almost evenly balanced between winners and losers. On the positive side are four groups in Ethiopia that have won effective autonomy and seven national peoples elsewhere that secured autonomy agreements largely ending open conflict. Outcomes in four cases are under negotiation. On the negative side are nine national movements that were suppressed without significant gains; in four cases serious conflict continues.

Autonomy agreements have helped dampen rebellions by the Basques, the Moros, the Miskitos in Nicaragua, the Nagas and Tripuras, the people of Bangladesh's Chittagong Hill Tracts, and the Afars of Ethiopia. They failed to do so in Sudan and Sri Lanka, and have been aborted elsewhere. The success of autonomy arrangements in ending or preempting civil wars lies in the details and implementation of the arrangements. The details concern the division of powers and responsibilities between the contending parties; successful agreements have required a delicate balancing of communal and state interests, arrived at

through protracted negotiations. The challenge for implementation is that both parties must honor the agreements and not defect—even in the face of political challenges and the continuation of violence by militant factions.

9. What approaches work to balance the interests of contending groups within states?

Most politically assertive minorities want access to political and economic opportunities, and protection of their rights in existing societies and states. Can any general lessons be drawn about how to accommodate their demands and deflect violent conflict? The answers depend on the cultural and political context.

Western democracies: Public policy toward minorities in Western democracies has evolved during the past half century from segregation to assimilation to pluralism and, in some countries, powersharing. Pluralism (multiculturalism, as it is known in North America) means arrangements that guarantee communal groups equal individual and collective rights, including the right to separate and coexisting identities. A shift toward pluralism, coupled with the devolution of power to peripheral regions and indigenous peoples, was mainly responsible for the decrease in communal conflicts in France, the United States, and other Western societies in the 1970s and 1980s. The liability is that pluralism and powersharing, if vigorously promoted, can trigger a backlash from dominant groups. Whether pluralist approaches to the growing concentrations of third world immigrants and refugees in Western countries can overcome the political and cultural resistance of dominant majorities, is an especially important question.

Africa South of the Sahara: At the other end of the spectrum of development, most African societies are heterogeneous, poor, and ruled by weak governments composed of unstable multiethnic coalitions. With a few exceptions—Nigeria and Zambia for example—they lack the capacity to suppress or fully incorporate all their diverse peoples. There are two keys to managing communal conflict in these societies. One is to strengthen and stabilize political parties to ensure that all communal groups have a fair chance at joining governing coalitions—if not now, then in the future. The second is to devolve power to local governments to ensure citizen participation and to protect the local power base of those who lose their place in national coalitions. Both steps are consistent with the trends toward democratization that are evident in much of Africa. In a general way, they also resemble the policies of pluralism and devolution that have dampened communal conflicts in Western societies.

Middle East and North Africa: Communal conflicts in the Middle East are more intractable, especially civil wars centered on Palestinian and Kurdish claims for statehood. Inequalities between dominant groups and minorities in the Middle East are greater than in

Western societies or Africa; sectarian cleavages have deeper historical roots, and ethnoconflict has been more intense and protracted. There are several examples of the accommodation of contending communal interests in the region: governments in the Maghreb have made significant concessions to Berber culture, and the Egyptian government has sustained largely successful efforts to protect the Coptic minority against discrimination and attacks by Islamic militants.

Elsewhere, however, the role of outside powers is vital for the management of communal conflicts. Progress toward settlement of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict hinges on continued United States involvement in the peace process as well as on internal politics in Israel. The Lebanese civil war ended only after the establishment of Syrian hegemony in central and northern Lebanon and Israel's withdrawal from the south. The outcome of the Persian Gulf War and allied protection of Iraqi Kurds provided the Kurds a rare opportunity to establish a fragile autonomy—one that is not likely to survive the eventual lifting of international sanctions against the Iraqi government. And the Iranian government's desire to rebuild the economy and reestablish Iran's leading role in the region has made Iran susceptible to international pressures to moderate its repressive policies toward the Bahais.

Eastern Europe and the Soviet Successor States: The collapse of the Soviet Union and its hegemony in Eastern Europe has transformed communal conflict in the region. Half the Soviet Union's population before the breakup was non-Russian and 40 percent of the total was at risk. Now the sources of communal demands are the new minorities of the Soviet successor states who constitute as many as 60 percent (in Kazakhstan) of the population. In the aggregate, the new minorities are 25 percent of the former republics' populations, and many are pressing their own claims against new regimes. But thus far most are doing so with the strategies found in democratic societies (that is, mass mobilization and civil protest), not the classic forms of armed rebellion.

Most of the new regimes of eastern Europe are also responding democratically: the Czechoslovakian government negotiated Slovakia's independence; the Bulgarian government aims at the pluralistic incorporation of its Muslim and Turkish minority. Only the authoritarian communist regime of Serbia continues to play by Stalinist rules. Its policies of hegemonical nationalism and repression are unlikely to be restrained without international sanctions and military intervention, or reversed except by a democratic revolution from within.

10. Where are ethnopolitical conflicts most likely to escalate in the 1990s?

The potential for escalating ethnopolitical conflict remains high in the Soviet successor states. However, in the Slavic states most conflicts will be settled democratically. The prospects for rebellion, civil war,

and deadly intercommunal conflict are considerably greater in the Caucasian and Central Asian regions. The botched Russian effort to end Chechnya's secession by force conveys two lessons: to the Russians that they must resume their reliance on compromise in such disputes; and to restive national minorities that they must choose cautious political strategies. Nonetheless, if Russian democracy survives, civil and multicultural societies are likely to prevail in most of the region by the year 2000.

The western European and North American democracies will see a resurgence of ethnic conflict. Some conflicts will be based on regional claims by people like the Quebecois and the Scots, but most will be a consequence of class and communal tensions between dominant groups and minorities of third world origin. The virtues of democratic politics are that they allow the expression of minority interests and encourage accommodation. The vice is that they are susceptible to the politics of ethnocentric reaction. The norms of democratic accommodation will likely prevail and by 2000 various kinds of pluralist arrangements will be in place in the Western societies that do not have them now.

Indigenous activism is also likely to escalate throughout the Americas, especially in the Latin American societies that have been most resistant to the claims of native peoples. Positive responses will be seen in democratic societies in the region, but within limits: indigenous demands for control of land and resources are not likely to be met if they constrain the economic development Latin American leaders regard as essential to political stability. Eight Central and South American societies also have significant Afro-American minorities, most of whom are seriously disadvantaged; except in Brazil, they probably will remain politically quiescent.

In the third world, South Asia will suffer the most severe escalation of communal conflicts in the 1990s. Long-standing regional conflicts in India—in Assam, Punjab, and Kashmir—have intensified in the early 1990s, prompting communal demands by other peoples. Religiopolitical tensions are increasing between Muslim and Hindu communities in most countries in the region. Settlers from Bangladesh's densely crowded lowlands continue to push into the uplands, where they are embroiled in violent communal conflict with tribal peoples. Pakistani politics is rent by communal divisions among Pashtuns, Sindhis, Baluchis, and smaller minorities. In the aftermath of Afghanistan's failed communist revolution, communal rivalries have intensified among the once-dominant Pashtuns and Tajiks, Uzbeks, Hazaris, and others. The only de-escalating communal conflict in the subcontinent is between Tamils and the Sinhalese-dominated state in

Sri Lanka, and its decline is the result of repression more than accommodation.

Forecasting the future of communal conflict elsewhere in the third world is even more speculative. Most of the Middle East's conflicts are already under way, but few are likely to be settled decisively in the near future. Some ethnopolitical wars in Southeast Asia are winding down but others may intensify. In Africa the bitter communal conflicts in Ethiopia and South Africa are being worked out in the political arena, but others continue in Sudan and Somalia. In 1993–1994 stunning violence erupted in Burundi and Rwanda and is very likely to flare again in Burundi. The potential for communal warfare in Nigeria and Zaire is equally threatening.

11. What is the functional place of communal groups in the global system of states?

The most radical proposal for resolving conflicts between states and peoples is to reconstruct the state system so that territorial boundaries correspond more closely to the social and cultural boundaries among peoples. But such a strategy would leave unsatisfied the aspirations of many nonterritorial communal groups. For most others it would create as many problems as it resolved. The most likely means taken toward achieving such an objective are destructive civil wars, such as those in the former Yugoslavia, Ethiopia, Chechnya and Georgia. Even if political reconstruction is achieved peacefully, it is likely to create or intensify new communal conflicts. Few ethnonationalist regions are homogeneous, and the leaders of new states are at risk of being trapped in new communal dilemmas.

A more constructive and open-ended answer is to recognize and strengthen communal groups within the existing state system. Elise Boulding contends that devolving authority to communal groups will help resolve the fundamental structural problems of modern states: most are too large in scale and too far removed from many of their citizens to understand or deal with local concerns.⁵

Progress toward the objective of a more pluralist world system requires that the international community accept a common obligation to protect collective rights within such an emergent system. Communal groups should have protected rights to individual and collective existence and to cultural self-expression without fear of political repression. The counterpart of such rights is the obligation not to impose cultural standards or political agendas on other peoples. This applies with special force to situations in which the international community supports the establishment of new states as a way of resolving conflicts within multiethnic societies, as in the former Yugoslavia. No new claims to statehood or autonomy ought to be recognized internationally unless the claimants assume the obligation, under pain of sanctions, to respect the rights of minorities within their borders. ■

⁵Elise Boulding, "Ethnicity and New Constitutive Orders: An Approach to Peace in the Twenty-First Century" (Paper prepared for a Festschrift for Kinhide Mushakoji, n.d. [1990]).

"It has been argued that including all forces that threaten well-being within the definition of national security would drain the term of its meaning. Such arguments imply that the traditional definition of national security was intellectually coherent or useful. But proponents of environmental security would argue that the traditional definition of national security distorted perceptions of global realities as well as policy priorities."

Environmental Security as a National Security Issue

BY GARETH PORTER

The distinguishing characteristic of post-cold war world politics is the absence of what international security analyst Lawrence Freedman calls the "strategic imperative"—the motivation among the major states to compete for military power. As military threats have subsided or disappeared, other threats, especially environmental ones, have emerged with greater clarity. It has thus become possible to argue persuasively that environmental threats are an essential component of national or international security.

This idea, often expressed by the term "environmental security," has been adopted by the Clinton administration as part of United States national security doctrine. But it remains controversial, both conceptually and politically. And a strong isolationist trend brought into Washington by the new Republican-controlled Congress threatens to reverse the progress already made in redefining United States national security.

NATIONAL SECURITY AND ENVIRONMENTAL SECURITY

The term "national security" has never had a precise definition, even during the cold war. In the post-cold war world divergent concepts of security have been advanced by theorists and statesmen, each of which can be categorized on the basis of three major dimensions:

- whether it assumes that security is based primarily on conflict or cooperation;
- the unit of analysis (individual, national, or global);
- the threats with which it is concerned.

The traditional concept of national security that evolved during the cold war viewed security as a function of the successful pursuit of interstate power competition. It took the sovereign state as the exclusive unit of analysis, and was concerned only with military threats or those related to an "enemy." National security was also used to convey the idea that a particular set of problems was most important to the state, and required the mobilization of a high level of material and human resources.

Environmental security represents a significant departure from this approach to national security. It addresses two distinct issues: the environmental factors behind potentially violent conflicts, and the impact of global environmental degradation on the well-being of societies and economies. The idea that environmental degradation is a security issue when it is a cause of violent conflict appears to be consistent with the traditional definition of national security. However, proponents of environmental security emphasize that environmental degradation is the result of impersonal social and economic forces, and requires cooperative solutions. This focus on threats that do not involve an enemy state or political entity disturbs many theorists and practitioners of national security, for whom the only issues that should be viewed as "security" issues are those that revolve around conflict itself.

More broadly, environmental security is concerned with any threat to the well-being of societies and their populations from an external force that can be influenced by public policies. Proponents of environmental security argue that increasing stresses on the earth's life-support systems and renewable natural resources have profound implications for human health and welfare that are at least as serious as traditional military threats.

Whether environmental security is compatible or in conflict with an exclusive focus on the security of the nation-state is a question on which proponents have expressed different views. Some consider environmental threats within a framework of national security,

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although they also stress the inadequacy of traditional nation-state responses to global environmental challenges based on concerns with national sovereignty. Others argue that environmental security is inherently global rather than national in character, since environmental threats affect all humanity and require coordinated action on a global scale.¹

Environmental security deals with threats that are not only the unintended consequences of social and economic activities, but that also develop very slowly compared with military threats. Thus the time horizons it requires for policy planning are extremely broad. While some programs aimed at reducing population growth rates can achieve significant results in a decade or two, it takes far longer for declining birth rates to affect natural resource management. A typical program to reverse the environmental degradation of an entire ecosystem and to rehabilitate that ecosystem can take as long as 50 years to produce the desired results. Policies to restore the ozone layer will take up to 100 years to take effect, and those to produce climate change could take even longer. These time horizons represent a major obstacle to integrating environmental security into policymaking processes, since political systems are not organized to look that far ahead.

THE GLOBAL DIMENSIONS OF ENVIRONMENTAL THREATS

The case for environmental security rests primarily on evidence that there has been serious degradation of natural resources (freshwater, soils, forests, fishery resources, and biological diversity) and vital life-support systems (the ozone layer, climate system, oceans, and atmosphere) as a result of the recent acceleration of global economic activities. These global physical changes could have far-reaching effects in the long run.

The thinning of the stratospheric ozone layer because of the accumulation of certain man-made chemicals could have a severe impact on human health and nutrition. It is estimated that if the 1987 Montreal Protocol phasing out ozone-depleting chemicals had not been signed and strengthened by amendments, chlorine levels by the year 2020 would be six times higher than the level at which significant ozone depletion starts. A 10 percent ozone loss over North America is expected by the year 2000, and ozone levels 20 to 35 percent below normal have already been recorded over Siberia and Europe. Although research is still inadequate, there is some evidence that increased exposure to UV-B radiation as a result of the destruction of the ozone layer could damage crops and phytoplankton

(the basis of the marine food chain) and reduce human immunity to infectious disease.

Climate warming from increased concentrations of carbon dioxide and other gases that trap heat in the atmosphere could alter the fundamental physical conditions of life on the planet. According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), an international scientific body, a doubling of atmospheric concentrations of these gases (compared with those of the previous century) could increase average global temperatures by 1.5 to 4.5 degrees centigrade, or 2 to 9 degrees Fahrenheit. The high end of that estimate would be roughly the same as the total temperature rise since the peak of the last Ice Age. Such increases could raise sea levels by about one to one and a half feet by 2050, flooding coastal lowland plains and wetlands worldwide and increasing storm tides and the intrusion of saltwater into estuaries and groundwater. Among the other physical changes that could be triggered even by a modest warming of temperatures are increased frequency and severity of hurricanes, droughts, and flooding. And increased weather extremes that accompany climate warming may already be contributing to an increase in and geographical redistribution of vector-borne diseases.

Biological diversity is being lost at a rate estimated at 2 percent to 10 percent of all species per decade. This rate of loss is unparalleled since the last mass extinction of species 65 million years ago. Biological diversity is one of humankind's chief resources for coping with diseases and other unexpected natural changes: its loss would dramatically reduce the chances of discovering natural substances that might hold the cure for existing and future diseases. And genetic uniformity of the world's foodcrop varieties poses the risk that diseases or pests that develop resistance to pesticides could destroy a large proportion of the crops on which most of the world's population depends. The genes of relatives of those varieties that grow in the wild, which will be needed to respond to such threats to food security, are now threatened by deforestation and conversion of land to agriculture.

The health of the world economy itself depends on avoiding the depletion of renewable natural resources. The degradation of cultivated land threatens to reduce agricultural productivity in large areas of the developing world. It has been estimated that 11 percent of the earth's total vegetated surface has already suffered moderate to extreme soil degradation because of deforestation, overgrazing, or unsound agricultural practices.

Developing countries have already suffered significant reductions in productivity because of soil loss, deforestation, and other forms of environmental degradation: Indonesia's loss has been estimated at 4 percent of GDP and Nigeria's at nearly 18 percent of GDP. If rates of economic loss from environmental

¹Jessica Tuchman Mathews, "Redefining Security," *Foreign Affairs*, Spring 1989; and Norman Myers, *Ultimate Security: The Environmental Basis of Political Stability* (New York: Norton, 1993).

degradation continue to rise in key developing countries in future decades, the health of the entire world economy will be affected.

Each of these environmental threats to global well-being is subject to significant empirical and scientific uncertainty: neither the actual increased exposure to UV-B from the thinning of the ozone layer nor the degree of harm it will do to plants, animals, and humans is calculable; neither the eventual increase in global average temperatures from a given level of greenhouse gas emissions nor the consequences for weather patterns, disease, crops, or sea level rise can be known. The actual rate of species loss is still unknown, and the impact of the loss of a given proportion of all species cannot be easily gauged. Finally, there is no reliable global data on the actual rate of land degradation, nor can the impact of land degradation on future food production be predicted with any confidence.

The uncertainties associated with these environmental threats are comparable, however, to those associated with most military threats that national security establishments prepare for. Military planning is based on "worst-case" contingencies that are considered relatively unlikely to occur, yet military preparations for such contingencies are justified as a necessary insurance policy or "hedge" against uncertainty. But in the United States, for example, the potential harm that global environmental degradation poses to the health and livelihoods of Americans is arguably worse than those posed by most military security threats for which the country has prepared.

ENVIRONMENTAL FLASHPOINTS

The relationship between scarce natural resources and international conflict is not a new issue. But unlike traditional national security thinking about such conflicts, which focus primarily on nonrenewable resources like minerals and petroleum, the environmental security approach addresses renewable resources—those that need not be depleted if managed sustainably.

Conflicts involving renewable natural resources are of two kinds: those in which resource depletion is the direct objective of the conflict, and those in which it is an indirect cause of the conflict. Freshwater resources and fish stocks are the clearest examples of renewable resources that have been the direct objective of potentially violent international conflicts.

Conflict over the shared waters of international rivers has long been of interest to national security planners. The United States intelligence community estimated in the mid-1980s that there are 10 places in the world—half in the Middle East—where war could break out because of dwindling freshwater supplies. Especially dangerous are the Jordan River, which is shared by Jordan, Israel, and Lebanon; the Nile, shared

by Egypt, Ethiopia, and Sudan; and the Euphrates, shared by Iraq, Turkey, and Syria.

International conflicts over fishing grounds have been frequent in recent decades. Thirty such conflicts were reported last year alone, including several in which force was used. Without any international agreement on managing fish stocks that straddle the exclusive economic zones of states or that migrate between EEZs, or between coastal zones and the high seas, even normal fluctuations in stocks increase interstate competition over fishery resources. But with more than half the world's major maritime fisheries already in serious decline from overfishing and the rest exploited up to or beyond their natural limits, the potential for political and even military confrontation is growing. Coastal states, such as Canada, Chile, and Russia, whose fish catch in their own EEZs is reduced by the operations of distant fishing fleets in the adjoining high seas, have threatened to use force to stop ships that they find overfishing, even outside their EEZs.

Shared freshwater resources and maritime fisheries are good examples of issues that involve more than traditional competition for control over natural resources. Equitable sharing of the Jordan River, for example, will not be enough to prevent Jordan and Israel from running short of water: it has been projected that, by the year 2000, Israel's demand for water will exceed available supply by one-third, while Jordan's demand will exceed its supply by one-fifth. Sustainable water-use plans for both states must be formulated as part of water-sharing agreements, including provisions for greater efficiency in water use by eliminating water subsidies, choosing less water-intensive crops, reducing water losses in irrigation, and minimizing water pollution.

The primary reason for the decline in maritime fisheries is too many fishing boats with too much modern fishing technology, such as bigger nets, electronic fish detection equipment, and mechanized hauling gear. To protect the world's fish stocks from further depletion, the international community will have to establish strict limits on entry into the fishing industry; establish binding standards on capitalization of fishing fleets, excessive fleet size, and inappropriate fishing gear; and set a numerical limit on the total catch and the percentage of the total catch per entrant. Without such a tough, enforceable international treaty, traditional power tactics in pursuit of control over fisheries resources will do nothing to protect a state's interest in continued access to the resource.

The environmental security approach thus offers a clear alternative to traditional security thinking about international conflicts over renewable natural resources. It suggests that the key problem is to conserve the resource in order to maintain adequate supplies well into the future, rather than trying to control more

of a resource that is being depleted. In the case of shared rivers, conservation efforts will involve two or three states; with maritime fisheries, it will require global agreement.

A distinctly different issue is the indirect effect of environmental degradation on violent domestic conflicts. This has been brought into focus by civil wars, the collapse of state structures, and major humanitarian crises in Africa. Eight African countries are already experiencing significant humanitarian crises (defined as putting at least 1 million people at risk) related to domestic strife or are at risk of experiencing them. The annual costs to the United States of foreign disasters and humanitarian crises increased from less than \$250 million in the latter half of the 1980s to nearly \$1.8 billion in 1994 because of the growing frequency and intensity of such crises and the need to use military forces to prevent or reduce human suffering.

Both Somalia and Rwanda, according to some analysts, illustrate the role that environmental deterioration has played in civil violence in Africa. In Somalia the direct cause of the violence was a power struggle among clan leaders who were heavily armed with Western weapons. But it is argued that the conflict was also spurred by economic change that had depleted renewable resources. External assistance from the United States and the World Bank helped drive the process by supporting the production of bananas, sugar, and livestock for export, which depleted the soil in the river valleys and led to overgrazing and desertification in already arid lands. Unsustainable development, according to this argument, fueled conflicts between herders and farmers over access to water and grazing land, which played into clan rivalries.²

While the direct cause of the genocidal violence in Rwanda in 1994 was a desperate regime exploiting ethnic fears in order to cling to power, the crisis also had a significant environmental dimension. One of the highest population growth rates in the world—3.7 percent annually by the 1970s—and relatively severe soil degradation contributed to reduced agricultural production and food availability, especially in areas with steep slopes or acidic soils. Agricultural decline was a key element in political protests by both Hutu and Tutsi farmers against the Hutu regime of President Juvénal Habyarimana in the early 1990s. The regime's response was to adopt a deliberate strategy of ethnic

hatred against all Tutsi in order to rally Hutu behind the government.³

Some analysts contend that the problem of states dissolving in violence and chaos because of a combination of socioeconomic inequality and environmental degradation is not confined to Africa. Thomas Homer-Dixon, the coordinator of a research project on environment and violent conflict, has concluded, on the basis of a number of case studies that include China, the Philippines, and Peru, that conflicts fueled in part by the degradation of renewable resources (cropland, water, forests, and fish), population growth, and unequal resource distribution are likely to become more frequent in future decades as more of these resources are depleted. He has suggested that a growing number of societies experiencing such conflicts will either fragment or become more authoritarian.⁴

THE UNITED STATES VIEW OF ENVIRONMENTAL SECURITY

In the wake of the cold war's end, the United States has moved officially to redefine national security to encompass environmental threats. The Bush administration was the first to acknowledge environmental security as part of overall United States security. A 1991 presidential document summarizing United States national security policy defined United States national security objectives to include "assuring the sustainability and environmental security of the planet. . ."

The Clinton administration has integrated environmental security even further into its national security policy. Official interest in the issue of "failed states" was spurred by a February 1994 article in *The Atlantic* by journalist Robert Kaplan, which popularized the idea that "chaos" will emerge as the main threat to global security in future decades. Weaving together personal reportage on West Africa and other developing regions with academic analyses, Kaplan declared that population growth and resource depletion would prompt mass migrations and incite group conflicts in Egypt and on the Indian subcontinent. The Kaplan article was read and discussed among Clinton administration officials, including Vice President Al Gore and President Bill Clinton himself.

In remarks to a forum on global issues last May, Clinton referred to civil wars in Africa and elsewhere that were "caused not only by historic conflicts but also by. . . deterioration of not only the economy; but the environment in which those people live." And at a conference on global population in June, Clinton referred to Kaplan's article in describing a stark vision of a future world of overpopulated countries, depleted resources, and extreme divisions of wealth and poverty. Clinton called for a strategy of "sustainable development" as a "comprehensive approach to the world's future." Without uttering the phrase "national security," he appeared to invoke its essence, referring

²"Africa's Greenwars: The Ecological Roots of the Starvation in Somalia and the Horn of Africa," *Friends of the Earth*, February 1993.

³See Jennifer M. Olson, "Factors Behind the Recent Tragedy in Rwanda," Department of Geography and the Center for Advanced Study of International Development, Michigan State University, November 1994.

⁴See Thomas F. Homer-Dixon, "Environmental Scarcities and Violent Conflict: Evidence from Cases," *International Security*, Summer 1994.

to the need to be "disciplined" and to "order our priorities" in addressing the interrelated global problems of population, health, environment, and equitable economic growth.

The Clinton administration explicitly adopted the concept of environmental security in its 1994 national security document, *A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement*, which asserts that increasing competition for dwindling renewable resources "is already a very real risk to regional stability around the world." The document also notes that environmental degradation "will ultimately block economic growth." It calls for partnerships between governments and nongovernmental organizations as well as between nations and between regions, and for a "strategically focused, long-term policy for emerging environmental risks."

SOURCES OF OPPOSITION

The concept of environmental security has been opposed by some academics, national security specialists, and conservative congressional leaders. An early criticism was that it muddies the concept of security, commingling threats that are related to conflict with those that are not. Similarly, it has been argued that including all forces that threaten well-being within the definition of national security would drain the term of its meaning.⁵ Such arguments imply that the traditional definition of national security was intellectually coherent or useful. But proponents of environmental security would argue that the traditional definition of national security distorted perceptions of global realities as well as policy priorities.

Early critics of environmental security also argued that its adoption could result in the militarization of environmental issues, making the agenda vulnerable to manipulation by traditional national security constituencies, especially the military. Because it invokes conflictual images, some have argued, the term suggests that environmental threats are caused by enemies, thus raising the specter of an aggressive and even militaristic approach to environmental problems.

This assumes that environmental security lacks an internal logic that challenges the premises of traditional national security thinking. As suggested earlier, the concept of environmental security directs attention to policy responses that are cooperative, not conflictual, even when the focus is on environmental problems that are the subject of international conflicts. The Clinton administration's acceptance of the environmental security approach clearly has not led to the militarization of environmental policy issues.

Another criticism, raised by some officials and academics, is that the environmental security argument is mainly a means of leveraging changes in budgetary allocations. But one of the functions of the traditional concept of national security was to ensure that sufficient resources were committed to military programs as a matter of highest national priority. Indeed, the enormous disparity between the resources budgeted for military security (\$250 billion) and those budgeted for global environment and other problems related to environmental security (less than \$5 billion) in fiscal year 1994 makes it clear that there is nothing like a reasonable balance among components of security in the allocation of budgetary resources. So a concept that justifies reallocating some of these resources is quite legitimate.

A final objection directed at environmental security is that environmental degradation and population pressures are not the primary causes of such conflicts. Since environmental and natural resource degradation is always imbedded in larger socioeconomic and political causes of conflict, proponents of environmental security cannot prove that such issues are crucial to the resulting violence. But they can make a persuasive case that relatively modest investments in resource conservation and family planning are justified by the much higher costs of responding to the collapse of states and the resulting human suffering.

The election of a Republican Congress in 1994 brought this argument to the fore. Congressional leaders are now arguing that the preventive measures proposed by proponents of environmental security would not have made any difference in cases such as Somalia and Rwanda. Unfortunately, it is impossible to ascertain what would have happened in Somalia or Rwanda had adequate assistance for sustainable development been provided early enough—that is, 20 to 30 years before the violence. In fact, very little assistance was actually provided to either country to conserve resources or reduce population pressures.

The debate over whether development assistance could help prevent violent conflict could become irrelevant, however, because Republican leaders also assert that neither conflict in the developing world nor global environmental threats should be viewed as significant United States concerns. They argue that the countries likely to suffer violent conflict have no strategic importance to the United States and should not be recipients of United States foreign assistance (except for emergency relief). They also discount the idea of global environmental deterioration, arguing in some cases that it is a fraud promoted by environmentalists with an axe to grind. If the Republican Congress drastically reduces aid for sustainable development and withholds funding for efforts to reduce global environmental threats, it will reverse, in effect, the Clinton administration's embrace of environmental security. ■

⁵See Daniel Deudney, "The Case Against Linking Environmental Degradation and National Security," *Millennium*, Winter 1990; and Mathias Finger, "The Military, the Nation State and the Environment," *The Ecologist*, vol. 21, no. 5 (1991).

"However depressed by the problems and prospects of collective security, [we] should take solace from Dag Hammarskjöld, who wisely described the UN as an institution created 'not in order to bring us to heaven but in order to save us from hell.' "

The United Nations at Fifty: Recent Lessons

BY THOMAS G. WEISS

The euphoria surrounding the end of the cold war was short-lived; the hopefulness of 1989 already seems like ancient history. Optimism about the possibilities for democratization and multilateral conflict resolution—captured prematurely by President George Bush's identification of a "new world order"—have ceded to more sober assessments about the precarious state of international security and the United Nations. Democratization has spread, but it has been accompanied by a plague of micronationalism and fragmentation. Rather than bringing about the "end of history," the termination of East-West confrontation has allowed the brutal expression of grievances. Spreading Western-style democracy throughout the world has been far more painful than Francis Fukuyama predicted.

At the same time, the beginning of the post-cold war era reinvigorated the UN Security Council and heralded enhanced prospects for international conflict management and intervention. While some observers remain buoyant, the bullishness of successful international efforts to thwart aggression in the Persian Gulf has changed to the depressing series of public UN flops or quasi failures in Bosnia, Croatia, Somalia, Haiti, and Rwanda, along with less visible ones in Angola, Afghanistan, and Sudan. Observers usually point to Somalia as the turning point, where Pollyannaish notions about intervening militarily to prevent aggression or stop thugs were replaced by more realistic estimations of the limits to such actions.

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Where are we then on the fiftieth anniversary of the world organization? What have been the UN's strengths over the last five years as it has become increasingly involved in efforts to maintain international peace and security? What have been its weaknesses? And what are some possible remedies for the latter?

HEEDING THE CALL— AND REELING FROM ITS COSTS

Two trends have merged to dominate the UN's handling of post-cold war crises. The most significant feature of international responses in the last five years has been the growing willingness of the international community to address, rather than ignore, emergencies within the borders of war-torn states. Of the 11 new security operations since the first-ever, heads-of-state summit of the Security Council in January 1992, all but 2 have been deployed in civil wars.

Although the language of Article 2, Section 7 of the UN Charter is intact, humanitarian imperatives have led governmental, intergovernmental, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to redefine when it is possible "to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state. . . ." Sometimes there is no sovereign (the case of collapsed states such as Somalia), and sometimes sovereignty is overridden in the name of higher principles (the case of assisting the Kurds in northern Iraq).

The second trend relates to an ever-burgeoning demand for helping hands from UN soldiers. Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali wrote this January that "the increased volume of activity would have strained the Organization even if the nature of the activity had remained unchanged." After stable levels of about 10,000 troops in the early post-cold war period, the number deployed in peacekeeping operations has jumped rapidly. In the last few years, 70,000 to 80,000 blue-helmeted soldiers have been authorized by the UN's annual "military" (peacekeeping) budget, which now approaches \$4 billion.

These figures represent just the additional costs of

deployment and not the real costs to troop-contributing countries. And they only hint at the magnitude of related problems. In recent years peacekeeping debts and arrears, along with those for the regular budget, have often totaled about three times the annual regular budget of the world organization. This does not even include the costs of any plan to partition Bosnia into ethnic enclaves, which would require up to another 50,000 well-trained and properly equipped troops and a possible \$10 billion annual price tag, or the conversion of the United States-led police effort in Haiti to a multilateral UN affair with a \$500 million budget each year.

IS THERE AN AGENDA FOR PEACE?

In January 1992, the Security Council requested that the newly elected secretary general assess the promise of the UN in a changed world. Since its June 1992 publication, probably no other international public policy document has generated so much discussion by practitioners and scholars as *An Agenda for Peace*. Boutros-Ghali's report has framed the debate and contains many intriguing suggestions, but it is at its most ambitious in defining the UN's potential security role. The breadth of activities is captured in the book's subtitle: *Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peacekeeping*.

The deployment of outside military personnel under UN command could be expanded usefully, the secretary general proposes, in areas similar to those in which they have been used effectively in the past. With the consent of the parties and using force only as a last resort and in self-defense, such deployments include supervising confidence-building measures, fact-finding, staffing early warning centers, and acting as buffers in either interstate or intrastate conflicts.

For many of the activities outlined by the secretary general, however, there is no UN track record; and where there is one, it is lackluster or worse. Moreover, there is no consensus among member states. The protection of UN civilian and humanitarian personnel is perhaps the most obvious and growing challenge. However, the experience of the UN Guards Contingent in Iraq—Boutros-Ghali's principal illustration—provides a poor guide to thinking about the future. The guards were helpful for a time, but not because of their pistols and blue baseball caps. Their effectiveness stemmed from the fact that they were based in a country whose population and military had been defeated and temporarily subjugated; Iraq found them initially less odious than Western troops; and NATO air power was stationed in nearby Turkey. Deploying more numerous but not significantly more effective UN soldiers in Bosnia reflects a similar kind of wishful thinking.

An Agenda for Peace explores the most significant departures under the rubric "peacemaking." This

designation struck many observers at the time, and continues to do so, as surprising. The normal definition of peacemaking concerns measures such as mediation and the use of good offices outlined under the "pacific settlement of disputes" of Chapter 6 of the UN Charter. The report, however, also includes every type of international effort, including coercive economic and military sanctions under Chapter 7.

Perhaps the most significant departure is the proposal to create peace-enforcement units. Cease-fires would be guaranteed by UN soldiers when warring parties no longer agreed to respect a negotiated halt to carnage. When there is no peace to keep, UN soldiers thus would make peace—and enforce it. The secretary general underscores that these soldiers would be more heavily armed than traditional peacekeepers. The experience in several situations—with at least 30 cease-fires for Bosnia and various agreements for Somalia and Rwanda—suggests how this kind of "peacemaking" exceeds the expectations of governments and the abilities of the UN.

In *Supplement to An Agenda for Peace*, a progress report issued this January to mark the UN's fiftieth anniversary, the secretary general trimmed his sails. He retreated from his earlier optimism and recommended caution because of events that had been partially or totally unforeseen in 1992. Among them are the intensity and ugliness of internal conflicts, and the quantitative and qualitative changes in the UN's efforts to deploy multifunctional operations. The new document is mainly a call for reduced expectations and reduced UN activities.

THINKING ABOUT THE NEXT INTERVENTION

The dramatic increase in UN operations has spawned a host of analyses. Yet discussions in UN circles are still characterized by confusion about traditional peacekeeping and coercion, and the gray areas in between.

The deployment of UN troops is literally dangerous and awkward, while many analysts, diplomats, and UN staff members stumble figuratively. The latter group fails to distinguish between traditional "peacekeeping"—the interposition of neutral forces when warring parties have agreed to a cease-fire, or at least to putting one in place—and what UN troops have recently engaged in. They employ the same term—even if it is qualified by adjectives (for example "extended" peacekeeping by the British or "aggravated" peacekeeping by the United States)—for a variety of situations where consent is absent or problematic and where military capacity outranks moral authority. The confusion is even greater when an operation shifts from Chapter 6 to Chapter 7 guidelines (Somalia and Rwanda) or combines the two (the former Yugoslavia).

The UN has shown for several decades that it can manage Chapter 6 military operations. Peacekeeping is often called "Chapter six-and-a-half," former UN Secre-

tary General Dag Hammarskjöld's clever indication that this UN invention was not foreseen by the charter's framers. But peacekeeping is really an extrapolation of Chapter 6 rather than a would-be Chapter 7. Management and financial reforms undoubtedly could improve peacekeeping because each operation is still put together from scratch, based on best-case scenarios with inadequate resources.

The UN has also demonstrated its inability to handle Chapter 7, which the secretary general now recognizes clearly in his *Supplement*: "Neither the Security Council nor the Secretary-General at present has the capacity to deploy, direct, command and control operations for this purpose." The lack of capability to manage enforcement cannot be wished away, nor can it be overcome by tinkering. The world organization's diplomatic and bureaucratic structures are inimical to initiating and overseeing military efforts when serious fighting rages, and where coercion rather than consent is the norm.

Part of the problem is that the UN has relied on the experience of past operations when coping with recent crises instead of delineating their new characteristics. "Peacekeeping" should be reserved for consensual missions, which is where the UN secretariat has a clear comparative advantage. Otherwise, peacekeeping becomes an infinitely elastic concept without operational significance. It is not a cure-all for the chaos of ethnonationalism, but rather, under certain circumstances, a discrete tool for conflict management.

After the initial experiences of the early post-cold war era, the secretary general straightforwardly acknowledged in his first press conference this year "that the United Nations does not have the capacity to carry out huge peace enforcement operations, and that when the Security Council decides on a peace enforcement operation, our advice is that the Security Council mandate a group of Member States [that] have the capability." This tough realization is reflected in the *Supplement*, where Boutros-Ghali notes that peacekeeping and enforcement "should be seen as alternative techniques and not as adjacent points on a continuum."

Conceptual clarity is also absent from many considerations of "intervention." This term covers a spectrum of possible actions—from making telephone calls to dispatching military forces—that are intended to alter the internal affairs of another country. As such, it is almost synonymous with the state practice of international relations. Although intervention makes diplomatic hairs stand on end, international relations since the end of the cold war have involved more significant outside interference in domestic affairs than had been sanctioned earlier by states.

In general, intervention is an inevitable occurrence that weak states are often unable to resist. But what concerns us here are Chapter 7 determinations by the

Security Council to enforce international decisions through economic and military sanctions. Both have consequences for suffering civilians and helping humanitarians. Talk-show hosts, academics, politicians, and people on the street are questioning whether or not to use military force to support humane values. There are two options: a return to traditional peacekeeping and the use of minimum force only as a last resort and in self-defense, or the measured application of superior military force in support of more ambitious international decisions, including the enforcement of human rights standards and access to civilians in war zones.

Timidity is presently in favor, and the Somali and Bosnia experiences are critical to this trend. The United States military, for example, prefers missions where overwhelming firepower can secure quick and decisive victories with minimal casualties. This clearly is not the situation in Mogadishu or Mostar, or on most battlefields that are the major security challenges of our times.

Many developing countries are also reticent or hostile. Some cling to the idea that state sovereignty does not permit outside intervention, which supposedly serves to protect them against bullying by a major power. Others also argue (perhaps correctly) that intervention is messy; outside military forces can lead to further instability and weaken democratic tendencies and existing institutions within war-torn countries. In addition, while the Security Council's definition of threats to international peace and security is expanding to cover virtually any subject, it is at the same time selectively applied.

Developing countries are joined by others whose reasoning is less ideological, albeit based on a static interpretation of public international law. According to this argument, in an anarchical world states require reciprocal rules to mitigate inevitable competition. As self-determination goes to its logical extremes, the best advice is "live and let live." This is accurate shorthand for nonintervention and restrictive interpretations of the Charter's Article 2, Section 7.

Other dissenters from more robust intervention include humanitarians working on the front lines. For them, "humanitarian intervention" is an oxymoron. They argue that humanitarian initiatives are strictly consensual and premised on impartiality and neutrality. Protected by the international law of armed conflicts and looked after by the International Committee of the Red Cross, political authorities in armed conflicts must be persuaded to meet their commitments for access to and respect of civilians. Intervention not only raises the levels of violence and complicates the lives of civilian humanitarians in the short run, but also makes reconciliation more difficult in the longer run.

With 1 in every 130 people on earth forced into flight from war, however, military intervention may be

the only way to halt genocide, massive abuses of human rights, and starvation. When there is sufficient political will, the international community can use enough force to help guarantee access to civilians in war zones, protect aid workers, and disarm belligerents.

It is worth recalling on the UN's fiftieth anniversary that the organization was supposed to be different from its defunct predecessor, the League of Nations. The provisions for enforcement in the UN Charter were designed to back up international decisions to stop atrocities in places such as Somalia, Bosnia, Rwanda, northern Iraq, and Haiti.

UNITED NATIONS OPERATIONS: WHAT IS SUCCESS? WHAT IS FAILURE?

A fundamental difficulty in evaluating recent UN operations is the ambiguity of "success" and "failure." Have efforts in the former Yugoslavia been successful because they saved lives and avoided a wider conflict in Europe, or a failure because the international community has not stood up to aggression, genocide, and the forced movement of people? Were short-term efforts in Somalia successful because death rates dropped in 1993, or a long-term failure because billions were spent to stop the clock temporarily, only to witness the country revert to banditry and chaos in 1995? Were efforts in Cambodia a short-term success because Cambodians went to the polls and permitted the return of King Norodom Sihanouk, or a long-term failure because the Khmer Rouge remains poised to return to civil war? Were efforts in El Salvador successful because peace was negotiated and elections held, or a failure because the root causes of the civil war remain? Without greater precision about what is expected of comprehensive operations, analysts can agree on the facts yet offer totally different evaluations about the utility of an operation.

Whatever the criteria for success and failure, however, there have been three major operational shortcomings in the last five years. First, the UN has been unable to address the problem of "failed states." The disappearance of state sovereignty has created a vacuum in local authority and public services. Recent civil wars have witnessed the destruction of infrastructure and the killing or flight of trained people from the public and private sectors. There has been no meaningful attempt to get these failed societies back on their collective feet.

Of course, the difficulties of nation-building should not be ignored; the American efforts in Vietnam or the Soviet Union's efforts in Afghanistan should make one stop and think. And the citizens of postconflict countries ultimately must take responsibility for the reconstitution of viable civil societies; they require, however, buffers and breathing space.

Second, traditional deficiencies in UN command and control have worsened. On the purely technical side,

communications are notoriously difficult because of multiple languages, procedures, and equipment, all of which are exacerbated by the lack of common training for individual contingents. Operations also suffer from multiple chains of command within a theater, and between the military and the civilian sides of the UN secretariat. Moreover, national contingents insist on consulting with their government, rather than the UN, when danger threatens.

The means to plan, support, and command peacekeeping, let alone enforcement, is scarcely greater now than during the cold war. Modest progress in establishing a situation room in New York and some consolidation in UN administrative services are hardly sufficient to make the militaries of major or middle powers feel at ease about placing the UN in charge of combat missions. And with the UN and its member states bogged down in civil wars—scarcely imagined by the founders and certainly not where successes have been common—there are increasing political, economic, and military pressures in Western capitals to avoid engagement.

Third, the comprehensiveness of recent UN operations creates acute new problems. In some ways operations were easier to conceptualize and conduct when they were less complex. The side-by-side deployment of international personnel within "multifunctional operations" requires new levels of professional knowledge within each unit as well as the institutional means to ensure coordination. This routinely involves expertise in military, civil administration (including election and human rights monitoring and police support), and humanitarian areas, along with an overlay of political negotiations and mediation.

For example, the most important lesson to be learned from the former Yugoslavia is that when the humanitarian and military aspects of a UN operation cannot be separated—because both are linked to Security Council decisions—then they must be better integrated. Greater efforts are required to spell out these relationships in advance to avoid the kind of ill-defined relationships into which drifted the main humanitarian organization, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), and the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in the former Yugoslavia.

No word is used more frequently in the corridors of international organizations and governments than "coordination." But it is a word that means many things to many people. Everyone is for it, but no one wishes to be coordinated. The two existing "models" for coordination—the UNHCR's role as "lead-agency" in the former Yugoslavia and the more systemwide overview provided by the Department of Humanitarian Affairs (DHA) in Rwanda—have supporters and detractors.

As for other emergencies—for example, UNICEF in Operation Lifeline Sudan in 1989—the authority and responsibilities associated with UNHCR's lead agency

role were never fully or formally defined. UN humanitarian organizations, like the rest of the system, operate as a loose association. Each organization has its own set of priorities, governing boards, and fundraising strategy. The absence of a truly systemwide response and the routine lack of support and guidance for NGOs is unfortunate when so many lives are at stake.

The structural problems of the DHA are well known: a limited budget, little field presence, inexperience, and no administrative leverage over the various moving parts of the UN system. Key donor governments were dissatisfied with the poor performance, particularly of the UN system, in the Persian Gulf. They concluded that greater coordination was required among humanitarians in complex emergencies. The creation of the DHA was supposed to help, but to date it has made little difference to humanitarian efforts.

THREE PROPOSALS FOR CHANGE

Reforms to address the UN's ills as it tries to maintain international peace and security have been collated by groups such as the Commission for Global Governance. They range from altering the composition of the Security Council and revitalizing the professional staff to overcoming the dismal financial picture of the world organization. The purpose here, however, is to craft three new ideas that respond to the three key problems that have been highlighted.

The first concerns failed states. The preponderance of civil wars notwithstanding, the state is hardly obsolete. The appearance of imploded states and others obviously on the brink of implosion suggest that "inadequate stateness" may be the overriding weakness in many areas where civil war is raging: for the international community, Uganda and Syria are preferable to Somalia. But there is no need to be nostalgic about the repressive national security state in order to argue that a minimal ability to guarantee law and order and a functioning economy is a necessary if insufficient condition for civil society without civil war.

Despite the UN's past experience in Palestine over four decades and more recently in Namibia and Cambodia, there is little evidence that the world organization would be permitted to be routinely involved in substituting itself for state authority. The UN is reluctant to assume such an assignment, but the need is painfully obvious. In the new breed of internal conflicts, the functions of government—social services, police, judiciary—are not only suspended, but also the assets of the state are looted and destroyed while officials are routinely killed or forced to flee.

A modified system of trusteeship is urgently required. In 1994 the last UN trust territory became independent, thereby leaving the Trusteeship Council, one of the six primary organs of the United Nations, with no *raison d'être*. Could not this council be transformed to handle temporarily the problems of

states that have ceased to function, and to provide breathing space for civil society to be reconstituted?

Proposals calling for the recolonization of countries unable to govern themselves are implausible, to say the least. Local populations would not tolerate a return to paternalism, and former colonial powers are not interested in any case. But the UN certainly could be called upon to assume temporary governorship selectively. Although the sensibilities of states that have been independent for nearly three decades or so are bound to be offended by the suggestion, what is the alternative? If the city of Boston can turn over the administration of its public schools to a private university, perhaps failed states could follow a similar logic in temporarily calling on the United Nations.

The second suggestion responds to the UN's military inadequacies. Experience suggests that UN decisions to intervene should be subcontracted to coalitions of major powers. Regional powers (Nigeria in West Africa and Russia in the former Soviet republics for example) could take the lead, combined with larger regional or global coalitions. Perhaps only when regional powers cannot or will not take the initiative should larger powers (France in Rwanda or the United States in Somalia for example) be expected to do so. However, allowing a power to block humanitarian intervention when others are willing to intervene (for example, the United States disapproval of intervention in Rwanda between early April and late June 1994) should be ruled out.

Three Security Council decisions between June and July 1994 indicate the growing relevance of military intervention by major powers in regions of their traditional interests: a Russian scheme to deploy its troops in Georgia to end the three-year-old civil war; the French intervention in Rwanda to help end genocidal conflict; and the United States plan to spearhead an invasion to reverse the military coup in Haiti. Inadequate UN capacities could be offset by regional powers, or even hegemonies, operating under the scrutiny of a wider community of states. Holding the interveners accountable for their actions, however, is necessary to distinguish this type of international security subcontract from gunboat diplomacy.

The third suggestion concerns humanitarian action in war zones. While military forces have an important logistic capacity in the most dire circumstances, the vast majority of human needs should continue to be the responsibility of civilian organizations. Although governments resist new entities, one should be created to deliver emergency aid in active war zones with Chapter 7 economic or military sanctions. This specialized cadre would be a truly "international" International Committee of the Red Cross. The volunteers should not be part of the common UN staff system since they would have to be appropriately insured and

compensated. In many ways, these people could be more in harm's way than soldiers.

Resources and relief specialists could be siphoned from existing humanitarian agencies with distinguished records in armed conflicts—such as the UNHCR, UNICEF, and the World Food Program. But under this arrangement, the UN's humanitarian agencies would themselves be absent when Chapter 7 is in effect. If they were involved when a peacekeeping operation changed to enforcement, they would withdraw.

Like subcontracted military forces, this new civilian delivery unit should form an integral part of a unified command reporting directly to the Security Council and not to the secretary general. The new UN humanitarian entity should also have ground rules for mounting and suspending deliveries. An essential element, for example, would be the explicit agreement by troop contributors that the UN-blessed interventionary force would be bound by the Geneva Conventions.

This new unit's members should be more comfortable than the staffs of most UN organizations with the inevitable effects on vulnerable civilians of imposing either economic or military sanctions against thugs and aggressors. Assistance would go to refugees and internally displaced people without regard to their precise juridical status. The civilian staff might well be dominated by retired military personnel who would not reject out of hand the necessity to subordinate themselves to a single chain of command when working with military protection forces. In any case, the staff should be experienced in dealing with military forces and able to bridge the military-civilian cultural divide that has impeded operations in many war zones.

In addition to enhanced effectiveness, separating this unit from the secretary general and attaching it directly to the Security Council would insulate the office of the UN's chief executive—which is ill-equipped to manage the use of military force—from Chapter 7's call to arms against a villain. The UN secretary general should be available for more impartial tasks, especially administering trusteeship or its equivalent for failed states.

"TO SAVE US FROM HELL"

The danger of prescription is evident. But the risk of not trying is even more perilous for a planet groping

with the debris of micronationalism as the major power refuses to exercise leadership.

The results of the November 1994 elections in the United States promise to complicate relations between UN political and humanitarian authorities and the world organization's most powerful member state. With the UN bogged down in civil wars, there are political, economic, and military pressures in Washington and other Western capitals to avoid new engagements and to pull back from multilateralism. The May 1994 Presidential Decision Directive-25 (PDD-25) reflects this reticence. This document on American participation in UN military efforts signals an abrupt policy reversal away from the "assertive multilateralism" trumpeted at the outset of the Clinton administration. Only three years separate the bullish optimism that guaranteed survival to the Kurds in northern Iraq and the utter indifference to Rwanda's genocide in April 1994. The initial proposals from the 104th Congress suggest continued deterioration in the dramatic transformation of American attitudes toward the United Nations.

The efforts required to relieve the insecurity and humanitarian crises ensuing from civil wars are in opposition to the military doctrines originally articulated by Reagan administration Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger and subsequently embroidered by former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Colin Powell and others. According to the military's post-Vietnam logic, the United States should not intervene unless it is committed to total victory, and has the full support of the public and Congress; the objectives should be obtainable, American casualties minimized, and a clear timetable for the exit of American troops set. These are hardly characteristic of the threats of our turbulent times, when the unpredictable interplay of fragmentation and cheap weapons makes chaos commonplace.

The challenge is daunting—for the United States and the United Nations. On the eve of the world organization's fiftieth anniversary, even many confirmed internationalists are deeply pessimistic. However depressed by the problems and prospects of collective security, they should take solace from Dag Hammarskjöld, who wisely described the UN as an institution created "not in order to bring us to heaven but in order to save us from hell." ■

Global security—once defined only in nuclear or military terms—is a concept undergoing change as it is increasingly identified in terms of social and economic aspects. However, the UN Development Program argues, more than the basic idea has to change: “In its place—or, at least, by its side—must be raised a new, more encompassing structure to ensure the security of all the people the world over.”

Redefining Security: The Human Dimension

Fifty years ago, Albert Einstein summed up the discovery of atomic energy with characteristic simplicity: “Everything changed.” He went on to predict: “We shall require a substantially new manner of thinking if mankind is to survive.” Although nuclear explosions devastated Nagasaki and Hiroshima, humankind has survived its first critical test of preventing worldwide nuclear devastation. But five decades later, we need another profound transition in thinking—from nuclear security to human security.

The concept of security has for too long been interpreted narrowly: as security of territory from external aggression, or as protection of national interests in foreign policy, or as global security from the threat of a nuclear holocaust. It has been related more to nation-states than to people. The superpowers were locked in an ideological struggle—fighting a cold war all over the world. The developing nations, having won their independence only recently, were sensitive to any real or perceived threats to their fragile national identities. Forgotten were the legitimate concerns of ordinary people who sought security in their daily lives. For many of them, security symbolized protection from the threat of disease, hunger, unemployment, crime, social conflict, political repression, and environmental hazards. With the dark shadows of the cold war receding, one can now see that many conflicts are within nations rather than between nations.

For most people, a feeling of insecurity arises more from worries about daily life than from the dread of a cataclysmic world event. Will they and their families have enough to eat? Will they lose their jobs? Will their streets and neighborhoods be safe from crime? Will they be tortured by a repressive state? Will they become a victim of violence because of their gender? Will their religion or ethnic origin target them for persecution?

In the final analysis, human security is a child who did not die, a disease that did not spread, a job that was not cut, an ethnic tension that did not explode in

violence, a dissident who was not silenced. Human security is not a concern with weapons—it is a concern with human life and dignity.

The idea of human security, though simple, is likely to revolutionize society in the twenty-first century. A consideration of the basic concept of human security must focus on four of its essential characteristics:

- Human security is a universal concern. It is relevant to people everywhere, in rich nations and poor. There are many threats that are common to all people—such as unemployment, drugs, crime, pollution, and human rights violations. Their intensity may differ from one part of the world to another, but all these threats to human security are real and growing.
- The components of human security are interdependent. When the security of people is endangered anywhere in the world, all nations are likely to get involved. Famine, disease, pollution, drug trafficking, terrorism, ethnic disputes, and social disintegration are no longer isolated events that are confined within national borders. Their consequences travel the globe.
- Human security is easier to ensure through early prevention than later intervention. It is less costly to meet these threats upstream than downstream. For example, the direct and indirect cost of HIV/AIDS (human immunodeficiency virus/acquired immune deficiency syndrome) was roughly \$240 billion during the 1980s. Even a few billion dollars invested in primary health care and family planning education could have helped contain the spread of this deadly disease.
- Human security is people-centered. It is concerned with how people live and breathe in a society, how freely they exercise their many choices, how much access they have to market and social opportunities—and whether they live in conflict or in peace.

In defining security, it is important that human security not be equated with human development. Human development is a broader concept—defined in previous UN *Human Development Reports* as a process of widening the range of people's choices. Human security means that people can exercise these choices safely and freely—and that they can be relatively confident that the opportunities they have today are not totally lost tomorrow.

There is, of course, a link between human security and human development: progress in one area enhances the chances of progress in the other. But failure in one area also heightens the risk of failure in the other, and history is replete with examples.

Failed or limited human development leads to a backlog of human deprivation—poverty, hunger, disease, or persisting disparities between ethnic communities or between regions. This backlog in access to power and economic opportunities can lead to violence.

When people perceive threats to their immediate security, they often become less tolerant, as the anti-foreigner feelings and violence in Europe show. Or, where people see the basis of their livelihood erode—such as their access to water—political conflict can ensue, as in parts of Central Asia and the Arab states. Oppression and perceptions of injustice can also lead to violent protest against authoritarianism, as in Myanmar and Zaire.

Ensuring human security does not mean taking away from people the responsibility and opportunity for mastering their lives. To the contrary, when people are insecure, they become a burden on society.

The concept of human security stresses that people should be able to take care of themselves: all people should have the opportunity to meet their most essential needs and to earn their own living. This will set them free and help ensure that they can make a full contribution to development—their own development and that of their communities, their countries, and the world. Human security is a critical ingredient of participatory development.

Human security is therefore not a defensive concept—the way territorial or military security is. Instead, human security is an integrative concept. It is embedded in a notion of solidarity among people. It cannot be brought about through force, with armies standing against armies. It can happen only if we agree that development must involve all people.

COMPONENTS OF HUMAN SECURITY

There have always been two major components of human security: freedom from fear and freedom from want. This was recognized right from the beginning of the United Nations. But later the concept was tilted in favor of the first component rather than the second.

The founders of the UN, when considering security, always gave equal weight to territories and to people. In 1945, the United States secretary of state reported to

his government on the results of the conference in San Francisco that set up the United Nations. He was quite specific on this point: "The battle of peace has to be fought on two fronts. The first is the security front where victory spells freedom from fear. The second is the economic and social front where victory means freedom from want. Only victory on both fronts can assure the world of an enduring peace. . . . No provisions that can be written into the Charter will enable the Security Council to make the world secure from war if men and women have no security in their homes and their jobs." It is now time to make a transition from the narrow concept of national security to the all-encompassing concept of human security.

People in rich nations seek security from the threat of crime and drug wars in their streets, the spread of deadly diseases like HIV/AIDS, soil degradation, rising levels of pollution, the fear of losing their jobs, and many other anxieties that emerge as the social fabric disintegrates. People in poor nations demand liberation from the continuing threat of hunger, disease, and poverty, while also facing the same problems that threaten industrial countries.

At the global level, human security no longer means carefully constructed safeguards against the threat of a nuclear holocaust—a likelihood greatly reduced by the end of the cold war. Instead, it means responding to the threat of global poverty traveling across international borders in the form of drugs, HIV/AIDS, climate change, illegal migration, and terrorism. The prospect of collective suicide through an impulsive resort to nuclear weapons was always exaggerated. But the threat of global poverty affecting all human lives—in rich nations and in poor—is real and persistent. And there are no global safeguards against these real threats to human security.

The concept of security must thus change urgently in two basic ways: from an exclusive stress on territorial security to a much greater stress on people's security; and from security through armaments to security through sustainable human development.

The list of threats to human security is long, but most can be considered under seven main categories.

Economic Security

Economic security requires an assured basic income—usually from productive and remunerative work, or in the last resort from some publicly financed safety net. But only about a quarter of the world's people may at present be economically secure in this sense.

Many people in the rich nations today feel insecure because jobs are increasingly difficult to find and keep. In the past two decades, the number of jobs in industrial countries has increased at only half the rate of GDP growth and failed to keep pace with the growth in the labor force. By 1993, more than 35 million people were seeking work, including a high proportion of women.

The problems are even greater in developing countries, where open registered unemployment is commonly above 10 percent, and total unemployment probably much higher. This is a problem especially for young people: for youths in Africa in the 1980s, the open unemployment rate was above 20 percent. And it is one of the main factors underlying political tensions and ethnic violence in several countries. But unemployment figures understate the real scale of the crisis since many of those working are seriously underemployed. Without the assurance of a social safety net, the poorest cannot survive even a short period without an income. Many, however, can rely on family or community support. Yet that system is rapidly breaking down. So, the unemployed must often accept any work they can find, however unproductive or badly paid.

The global shift toward more "precarious" employment reflects changes in the structure of industry. Manufacturing jobs have been disappearing, while many of the new opportunities are in the service sector, where employment is much more likely to be temporary or part-time—and less protected by trade unions.

For many people, the only option is self-employment. But this can be even less secure than wage employment, and those at the bottom of the ladder find it difficult to make ends meet. In the rural areas, the poorest farmers have little access to land. And even those who have some land or know of productive investment opportunities often find it difficult to farm and invest effectively because they have little access to credit. This, despite the mounting evidence that the poor are creditworthy. In many developing countries, 40 percent of the people receive less than 1 percent of total credit.

The shift to more precarious work has been accompanied by increasing insecurity of incomes. Nominal wages have remained stagnant or risen only slowly, but inflation has sharply eroded their value. As a result, real wages in many parts of the world have declined. In Latin America in the 1980s, they fell by 20 percent, and in many African countries during the same period, the value of the minimum wage dropped sharply—by 20 percent in Togo, 40 percent in Kenya, and 80 percent in Sierra Leone. Worse off are women—who typically receive wages 30 to 40 percent lower than those of men for doing the same jobs. In Japan and South Korea, women in manufacturing jobs earn only about half as much as men.

Income insecurity has hit industrial countries as well. In the European Union, 44 million people (some 28 percent of the workforce) receive less than half the average income of their country. In the United States, real earnings fell by 3 percent through the 1980s. Minority groups are usually among the hardest hit: in Canada, nearly half the indigenous people living on reservations now rely on transfer payments for their basic needs.

With incomes low and insecure, many people have

to look for more support from their governments. But they often look in vain. Most developing countries lack even the most rudimentary forms of social security, and budgetary problems in industrial countries have unravelled social safety nets. In the United States between 1987 and 1990, the real benefits per pensioner declined by 40 percent, and in Austria by 50 percent. In Germany, where maternity compensation has already been cut to 25 percent of full pay, the government decided that over the next three years unemployment and welfare payments will be cut by some \$45 billion—the largest cut in postwar German history.

The result: increasing poverty. In both the United States and the European Union, nearly 15 percent of the people live below the poverty line. The incidence of poverty varies with ethnic origin. In Germany, while the national average has been estimated at 11 percent, the incidence of poverty among foreign-born residents is 24 percent. But the most acute problems are in the developing countries, where more than a third of the people live below the poverty line—and more than 1 billion people survive on a daily income of less than \$1.

One of economic insecurity's severest effects is homelessness. Nearly a quarter of a million New Yorkers—more than 3 percent of the city's population and more than 8 percent of its black children—have stayed in shelters for the homeless over the past five years. London has about 400,000 registered homeless people. France has more than 500,000—nearly 10,000 in Paris. The situation is much worse in developing countries. In Calcutta, Dhaka, and Mexico City, more than 25 percent of the people constitute what is sometimes called a "floating population."

Food Security

Food security means that all people at all times have both physical and economic access to basic food. This requires not just enough food to go round; it requires that people have ready access to food—that they have an "entitlement" to food, by growing it for themselves, by buying it, or by taking advantage of a public food distribution system. The availability of food is thus a necessary condition of security—but not a sufficient one. People can still starve even when enough food is available—as has happened during many famines.

The overall availability of food in the world is not a problem. Even in developing countries, per capita food production increased by 18 percent on average in the 1980s. And there is enough food to offer everyone in the world around 2,500 calories a day—200 calories more than the basic minimum.

But this does not mean that everyone gets enough to eat. The problem often is the poor distribution of food and a lack of purchasing power. Some 800 million people around the world go hungry. In sub-Saharan Africa, despite considerable increases in the availability of food in recent years, some 240 million people (about 30 percent of the total) are undernourished. And in

South Asia, 30 percent of babies are born underweight—the highest ratio for any region in the world and a sad indication of inadequate access to food, particularly for women, who are often the last to eat in the household.

Government and international agencies have tried many ways of increasing food security—at both national and global levels. But these schemes have had only a limited impact. Access to food comes from access to assets, work, and an assured income. And unless the question of assets, employment, and income security is tackled upstream, state interventions can do little for food insecurity downstream.

Health Security

In developing countries, the major causes of death are infectious and parasitic diseases, which kill 17 million people annually, including 6.5 million from acute respiratory infections, 4.5 million from diarrheal diseases, and 3.5 million from tuberculosis. Most of these deaths are linked with poor nutrition and an unsafe environment—particularly polluted water, which contributes to nearly 1 billion cases of diarrhea a year.

In industrial countries, the major killers are diseases of the circulatory system (5.5 million deaths a year), often linked with diet and lifestyle. Next comes cancer, which in many cases has environmental causes.

In both developing and industrial countries, the threats to health security are usually greater for the poorest, people in the rural areas, and particularly children. In the developing countries in 1990, safe water was available to 85 percent of urban people but to only 62 percent of rural people. In industrial countries, the poor and racial minorities are more exposed to disease. In the United States, one-third of whites live in areas polluted by carbon monoxide, but the figure for blacks is nearly 50 percent.

The disparities between rich and poor are similar for access to health services. In the industrial countries on average, there is 1 doctor for every 400 people, but for the developing countries there is 1 for nearly 7,000 people (in sub-Saharan Africa the figure is 1 per 36,000). There also are marked disparities in health spending among developing countries. South Korea spends \$377 per capita annually on health care, but Bangladesh only \$7.

The widest gap between the North and the South in any human indicator is in maternal mortality—which is about 18 times greater in the South. Thus a miracle of life often turns into a nightmare of death just because a society cannot spare the loose change to provide a birth attendant at the time of the greatest vulnerability and anxiety in a woman's life.

Another increasing source of health insecurity for both sexes is the spread of HIV and AIDS. Around 15 million people are believed to be HIV-positive—80 percent of them in developing countries. By 2000, this

figure may rise to 40 million (13 million of them women).

Environmental Security

Human beings rely on a healthy physical environment—curiously assuming that whatever damage they inflict on the earth, it will eventually recover. This clearly is not the case, for intensive industrialization and rapid population growth have put the planet under intolerable strain.

In developing countries, one of the greatest environmental threats is to water. Today, the world's supply of water per capita is only one-third of what it was in 1970. Water scarcity is increasingly becoming a factor in ethnic strife and political tension. In 1990, about 1.3 billion people in the developing world lacked access to clean water. And much water pollution is the result of poor sanitation: nearly 2 billion people lack access to safe sanitation.

But people in developing countries have also been putting pressure on the land. Some 8 million to 10 million acres of forest land are lost each year—areas the size of Austria. And deforestation combined with overgrazing and poor conservation methods is accelerating desertification. In sub-Saharan Africa alone in the past 50 years, 65 million hectares of productive land turned to desert.

In industrial countries, one of the major environmental threats is air pollution. Los Angeles produces 3,400 tons of pollutants each year, and London 1,200 tons. Harmful to health, this pollution also damages the natural environment. The deterioration of Europe's forests from air pollution causes economic losses of \$35 billion a year. And the estimated annual loss of agricultural production due to air pollution is \$1.5 billion in Sweden, \$1.8 billion in Italy, \$2.7 billion in Poland, and \$4.7 billion in Germany.

Many environmental threats are chronic and long-lasting. Others take on a more sudden and violent character. Bhopal and Chernobyl are the more obvious sudden environmental catastrophes. Many chronic "natural" disasters in recent years have also been provoked by human beings. Deforestation has led to more intense droughts and floods. And population growth has moved people into areas prone to cyclones, earthquakes, or floods—areas always considered dangerous and previously uninhabited. Poverty and land shortages are doing the same—driving people onto much more marginal territory and increasing their exposure to natural hazards. The result: disasters are more significant and more frequent.

Most developing countries have plans to cope with natural emergencies—Bangladesh, for example, has an elaborate warning system for cyclones arriving in the Bay of Bengal. Sometimes the scale is beyond national resources and calls for international action. Responses, however, are often slow, inadequate and uncoordinated. Current humanitarian efforts, particularly in the

UN system, are seriously underfunded. And many of the most vulnerable people perish before any international help arrives.

Personal Security

In many societies, human lives are at greater risk than ever before. For many people, the greatest source of anxiety is crime, particularly violent crime. Many countries report disturbing trends. In 1992 in the United States, 14 million crimes were reported to the police. These crimes exact a serious economic toll—estimated at \$425 billion a year. Reported crimes in Germany in the same year went up by 10 percent. In the second half of the 1980s, the murder rate in Italy and Portugal doubled, and in Germany it tripled. The increase in crime is often connected with drug trafficking. In Canada, 225 people in every 100,000—and in Australia, 400—suffer each year from drug-related crimes. In the second half of the 1980s, drug-related crimes roughly doubled in Denmark and in Norway—and increased more than thirtyfold in Japan.

Crime and violence are also facts of life in developing countries. Four children are murdered every day in Brazil, where the killing of minors has increased by 40 percent in the past year. In China, violent crime and rape are on the increase.

Among the worst personal threats are those to women. In no society are women secure or treated equally to men. Personal insecurity shadows them from cradle to grave. In the household, they are the last to eat. At school, they are the last to be educated. At work, they are the last to be hired and the first to be fired. And from childhood through adulthood, they are abused because of their gender.

True, women are getting better educated and entering employment, often as primary income-earners. Millions of women are now heads of households—one-third of households in the world as a whole, and up to one-half in some African countries, where women produce nearly 90 percent of the food. But there still are many shocking indicators of gender insecurity and physical violence. It was recently estimated that one-third of wives in developing countries are physically battered. One woman in 2,000 in the world is reported to have been raped. In the United States, there were more than 150,000 reported rapes in 1993 alone. Sexual harassment on the job is common. In India, women's groups claim that there are about 9,000 dowry-related deaths each year. For 1992, the government estimates that the figure was 5,000.

Children, who should be the most protected in any society, are subject to many abuses. In the United States, nearly 3 million children were recently reported to be victims of abuse and neglect, and in 1992, nearly 7,000 children (20 a day) died from gunshot wounds. In developing countries, poverty compels many children to take on heavy work at too young an age—often at great cost to their health. In Brazil, more than

200,000 children spend their lives on the streets. Even conservative estimates put the combined number of child prostitutes in Thailand, Sri Lanka, and the Philippines at 500,000.

Community Security

Most people derive security from their membership in a group—a family, a community, an organization, a racial or ethnic group that can provide a cultural identity and a reassuring set of values. Such groups also offer practical support. The extended family system, for example, offers protection to its weaker members, and many tribal societies work on the principle that heads of households are entitled to enough land to support their family—and land is distributed accordingly.

But traditional communities can also perpetuate oppressive practices: employing bonded labor and slaves and treating women particularly harshly. In Africa, hundreds of thousands of girls suffer genital mutilation each year because of the traditional practice of female circumcision.

Some of these traditional practices are breaking down under the steady process of modernization. The extended family is now less likely to offer support to a member in distress. Traditional languages and cultures are withering under the onslaught of mass media. On the other hand, many oppressive practices are being fought by people's organizations and through legal action.

Traditional communities, particularly ethnic groups, can also come under much more direct attack—from each other. About 40 percent of the world's states have more than five sizable ethnic populations, one or more of which faces discrimination. In several nations, ethnic tensions are on the rise, often over limited access to opportunities—whether to social services from the state or to jobs from the market. Individual communities lose out, or believe they lose out, in the struggle for such opportunities. As a result, about half the world's states have recently experienced some interethnic strife. And this has been especially serious where national conflict was exacerbated by cold war rivalry.

Ethnic clashes often have brutal results. Since 1983 in Sri Lanka, more than 14,000 people have died in the conflict between the Tamils and the Sinhalese. Since 1981 in former Yugoslavia, more than 130,000 people have been killed and more than 40,000 women reportedly raped in what shamelessly was named "ethnic cleansing." In Somalia in 1993, there were up to 10,000 casualties—about two-thirds of them women and children—from clashes between rival factions or with UN peacekeepers.

Political Security

One of the most important aspects of human security is that people should be able to live in a society that honors their basic human rights.

In this respect, at least, there has been considerable progress. The 1980s were in many ways a decade of democratic transition—as many military dictatorships ceded power to civilian administrations and one-party states opened themselves up to multiparty elections.

Yet there still is a long way to go in protecting people against state repression. According to a 1993 survey by Amnesty International, political repression, systematic torture, ill treatment, or disappearance was still practised in 110 countries.

Human rights violations are most frequent during periods of political unrest. In 1992, Amnesty International concluded that unrest resulted in human rights violations in 112 countries, and in 105 countries there were reports of political detention and imprisonment. Unrest commonly results in military intervention. But the police can also be used as agents of repression—they are commonly cited as the perpetrators of human rights violations in both eastern and western Europe.

One of the most useful indicators of political insecurity in a country is the priority the government accords military strength—since governments sometimes use armies to repress their own people. If a government is more concerned about its military establishment than its people, this imbalance shows up in the ratio of military to social spending. The two nations with the highest ratios of military spending to education and health spending in 1980 were Iraq (8 to 1) and Somalia (5 to 1). Is it any surprise that these two nations ran into serious trouble during the 1980s and that the same powers that supplied them arms a decade ago are now struggling to disarm them?

GLOBAL HUMAN SECURITY

Some global challenges to human security arise because threats within countries rapidly spill beyond national frontiers. Environmental threats are one of the clearest examples: land degradation, deforestation, and the emission of greenhouse gases affect climatic conditions around the globe. The trade in drugs is also a transnational phenomenon—drawing millions of people, both producers and consumers, into a cycle of violence and dependency.

When human security is under threat anywhere, it can affect people everywhere. Famines, ethnic conflicts, social disintegration, terrorism, pollution and drug trafficking can no longer be confined within national borders. And no nation can isolate its life from the rest of the world.

The real threats to human security in the next century will arise more from the actions of millions of people than from aggression by a few nations—threats that will take many forms.

Unchecked Population Growth

The rapid rate of population growth—coupled with a lack of developmental opportunities—is overcrowd-

ing the planet, adding to the enormous pressures on diminishing nonrenewable resources.

This growth—at the root of global poverty, international migration, and environmental degradation—is unprecedented in history. It took 1 million years to produce the first 1 billion people on earth. It will now take only 10 years to add the next billion to today's 5.5 billion.

The response has to be multifaceted. Certainly, family planning information and services must be available to all those who want them. But it is folly to treat population growth as a clinical problem. It is a development problem. Indeed, in many societies, human development (especially the education of females) has proved the most powerful contraceptive.

Any plan of action to slow population growth must receive national and international support, and include both family planning services and targeted human development programmes.

Despite the considerable international rhetoric on unchecked population growth, population programs are underfinanced. The World Bank estimates that if cost-effective methods are adopted, it would take only an additional \$2 billion a year to provide family planning services to the 120 million women in developing countries desiring such services.

Disparities in Economic Opportunities

During the past five decades, world income increased sevenfold in real GDP and income per person more than tripled in per capita GDP. But this gain has been spread very unequally—nationally and internationally—and the inequality is increasing. Between 1960 and 1991, the share of world income for the richest 20 percent of the global population rose from 70 percent to 85 percent. Over the same period, all but the richest quintile saw its share of world income fall—and the meager share for the poorest 20 percent declined from 2.3 percent to 1.4 percent.

One-fifth of humankind, mostly in the industrial countries, thus has well over four-fifths of global income and other developmental opportunities. These disparities reflect many other disparities—in trade, investment, savings, and commercial lending. Overall, they reflect unequal access to global market opportunities. Such disparities entail consequences for other aspects of human security. They encourage overconsumption and overproduction in the North, and they perpetuate the poverty-environment link in the South. Inevitably, they breed resentment and encourage migration from poor countries to rich.

Migration Pressures

One of the clearest consequences of population growth and deepening poverty in developing countries is the growth in international migration. At least 35 million people from the South have taken up residence in the North in the past three decades, and around 1

million join them each year. Another million or so are working overseas on contracts for fixed periods. The number of illegal international migrants is estimated to be around 15 million to 30 million.

In addition, there are large numbers of refugees. In the developing countries today, there are nearly 20 million internally displaced people—and worldwide, probably around 19 million refugees.

These pressures are likely to increase. Expanding populations, limited employment opportunities, closed international markets, and continuing environmental degradation will force millions more to leave their own countries. But the affluent nations are closing their doors—since they face stagnating economies, high unemployment, and the prospect of “jobless growth.”

Sometimes, the policies of the industrial countries intensify migration pressures. First, they restrict employment in developing countries by raising trade and tariff barriers that limit their export potential: if the job opportunities do not move toward the workers, the workers are likely to move toward the opportunities.

Second, the industrial countries do have a real demand for workers—whether for highly educated scientists or for unskilled labor to do the difficult manual jobs that their own workers reject. This demand leads to highly ambivalent attitudes toward immigration: official disapproval, with systems of enforcement less effective than they might be so that enough construction workers, fruit pickers, or nannies can find their way in.

Control of international migration is not just an administrative issue. It is primarily an economic issue—requiring a new framework of development cooperation that integrates foreign assistance with trade liberalization, technology transfers, foreign investments, and labor flows.

Environmental Degradation

Most forms of environmental degradation have their strongest impact locally. But other effects tend to migrate. Polluted air drifts inexorably across national frontiers, with sulphur dioxide emissions in one country falling as acid rain in another. About 60 percent of Europe's commercial forests suffer damaging levels of sulphur deposition. In Sweden, about 20,000 of the country's 90,000 lakes are acidified to some degree; in Canada, 48,000 are acidic. And the source of the problem in these instances is not only within the country.

The emission of chlorofluorocarbons also has an international, indeed a truly global, effect, as the gases released in individual countries attack the ozone layer. In 1989, research teams found that the ozone layer over Antarctica was reduced to only 50 percent of its 1979 level. Ozone filters out ultraviolet radiation, which can lead to various kinds of skin cancer. Between 1982 and 1989 in the United States, the

incidence of the most dangerous form of skin cancer, melanoma, rose by more than 80 percent.

The production of greenhouse gases also has a global impact. Layers of these gases, including carbon dioxide and methane, accumulate in the upper atmosphere and contribute to global warming because they reflect back infrared radiation that would otherwise escape into space. In 1989, the United States and the former Soviet Union were the largest producers of such gases—respectively responsible for 18 percent and 14 percent of total emissions. But the effects will be felt all over the globe—and could have their greatest impact on the poorest countries. With a 1-meter rise in sea level partly due to global warming, Bangladesh (which produces only 0.3 percent of global emissions) could see its land area shrink by 17 percent.

Biological diversity is more threatened now than at any time in the past. Tropical deforestation is the main culprit, but the destruction of wetlands, coral reefs, and temperate forests also figures heavily. Germany and the Netherlands lost nearly 60 percent of their wetlands between 1950 and 1980. And a recent analysis of tropical forest habitats, which contain between 50 and 90 percent of the world's species, concluded that, at current rates of loss, up to 15 percent of the earth's species could disappear over the next 25 years. Today, only 45 percent of the world's temperate rainforests remain.

The trends of the past 20 years show an accelerated destruction of coastal marine habitats, increases in coastal pollution, and in many areas, a shrinking of the marine fish catch. In 1990, the global fish catch declined for the first time in 13 years—a result of overfishing, coastal habitat destruction and water pollution.

As habitats are fragmented, altered, or destroyed, they lose their ability to provide ecosystem services—water purification, soil regeneration, watershed protection, temperature regulation, nutrient and waste recycling, and atmospheric maintenance. All these changes threaten global human security.

Drug Trafficking

The trade in narcotic drugs is one of the most corrosive threats to human society. During the past 20 years, the narcotics industry has progressed from a small cottage enterprise to a highly organized multinational business that employs hundreds of thousands of people and generates billions of dollars in profits. The retail value of drugs now exceeds the international trade in oil—and is second only to the arms trade. The main producing countries are Afghanistan, Bolivia, Colombia, Iran, Pakistan, Peru, and Thailand. And while consumption is rapidly spreading all over the world, the highest per capita use is reported to be in the United States and Canada. In the United States alone, consumer spending on narcotics is thought to exceed the combined GDPs of more than 80 developing

countries. In recent times, the countries of eastern Europe have also become prominent in drug trafficking—at least 25 percent of the heroin consumed in western Europe now passes through eastern Europe.

Despite the magnitude of the threat, the international community has yet to produce a coherent response. Some individual countries have drawn up their own action plans. But such lone efforts are not an effective, durable answer. As long as the demand persists, so will the supply. The real solution lies in addressing the causes of drug addiction—and in eradicating the poverty that tempts farmers into drug production.

International Terrorism

Between 1975 and 1992, there were an average of 500 international terrorist attacks a year. The peak in recent decades was in 1987, with 672 incidents. In 1992, the number dropped to 362, the lowest since 1975.

Between 1968 and 1992, the number of annual casualties was never less than 1,000; 1985 was the worst year, with 3,016 casualties—816 people killed and 2,200 wounded. Most of the victims have been the general public—though between 1980 and 1983 the majority were diplomats, and in the past two years most attacks have been made against businesses. While the number of victims may not look high, the fear that these attacks spread among the world's population at large is immense.

The focus of terrorist activity tends to move around the world. Until the early 1970s, most incidents were in Latin America. Then the focus switched to Europe. In the mid-1980s, most of the incidents were in the Middle East. And now, terrorist incidents take place all over the world. Terrorism, with no particular nationality, is a global phenomenon.

THE ACTION REQUIRED

This discouraging profile of human insecurity demands new policy responses, both nationally and internationally. Over the past five decades, humankind gradually built up an edifice of global security—an edifice of nuclear deterrents, power balances, strategic alliances, regional security pacts, and international policing through the superpowers and the UN.

Much of this global security framework now needs change. In its place—or, at least, by its side—must be raised a new, more encompassing structure to ensure the security of all people the world over. Some global concerns require national actions—others, a coordinated international response.

Although the international community can help prevent future crises, the primary responsibility lies with the countries themselves. And often it lies with the people themselves. In Somalia today, where there is no central government, people and their local communities are doing more than government authorities may

ever have done. But several countries also offer encouraging examples of what deliberate public policies of social integration can achieve. Malaysia, Mauritius, and Zimbabwe, for example, are countries whose governments have taken courageous national actions to overcome potentially dangerous national schisms.

The policies pursued by these countries show the importance of allowing everyone, of whatever race or ethnic group, the opportunity to develop his or her own capacities—particularly through effective health and education services. Second, they show the need to ensure that economic growth is broadly based, so that everyone has equal access to economic opportunities. Third, the importance of carefully crafted affirmative action programs designed so that all sections of society gain, but that the weaker groups gain proportionally more.

[What should the international community do? It might wish to consider the following:]

- Endorsing the concept of human security as the key challenge for the twenty-first century.
- Calling on people to make their full contribution to global human security and to bind together in solidarity.
- Requesting national governments in rich and poor countries to adopt policy measures for human security. They should ensure that all people have the basic capabilities and opportunities, especially in access to assets and to productive and remunerative work. They should also ensure that people enjoy basic human rights and have political choices.
- Recommending that all countries fully cooperate in this endeavour—regionally and globally. To this end, a new framework of international cooperation for development should be devised, taking into account the indivisibility of global human security—that no one is secure as long as someone is insecure anywhere.
- Requesting that the UN step up its efforts in preventive diplomacy—and recognizing that the reasons for conflict and war today are often rooted in poverty, social injustice, and environmental degradation—and back these efforts up through preventive development initiatives.
- Recommending further that today's framework of global institutions be reviewed and redesigned to prepare those institutions fully for doing their part in tackling the urgent challenges of human security, all within the framework of a paradigm of longer-term sustainable human development. ■

THE MONTH IN REVIEW

March 1995

INTERNATIONAL

European Union (EU)

March 6—The EU and Turkey announce that they will forge a customs union, effective January 1, 1996; Turkish agricultural products will be restricted.

March 26—Seven EU states that are part of the so-called Schengen group—Portugal, Spain, France, Belgium, Luxembourg, Germany, and the Netherlands—remove border controls; citizens from these countries will be able to cross borders without passport checks.

United Nations (UN)

March 8—The UN Human Rights Commission votes 21 to 20 to reject a resolution stating concern about China's human rights violations.

March 30—The Security Council extends sanctions against Libya, which has refused to surrender 2 suspects in the 1988 bombing of an American airliner over Lockerbie, Scotland.

March 31—The Security Council extends the UN mandate in the former Yugoslavia for 8 months; the UN force will be split into separate missions for Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Macedonia, and will maintain its current strength of 38,599 troops.

AFGHANISTAN

March 12—President Burhanuddin Rabbani announces that his forces have pushed the Taliban militia to a point 9 miles south of the capital in a major offensive that has killed or wounded at least 1,000 people in the last week. The Taliban, which organized as a military force about 6 months ago, has taken control of more than one-third of Afghanistan.

ALGERIA

March 10—A car bomb destroys a police housing complex in Algiers, wounding 63 people. The Armed Islamic Group had earlier announced a campaign to kill the female spouses and relatives of Algerian police and military personnel in response to the widespread arrests of female supporters and relatives of antigovernment Islamic activists.

March 14—Three women and 1 man are shot and killed near Algiers; 7 women have been killed since the Armed Islamic Group threatened to kill women unless the female Muslims were released by March 11.

March 26—Algerian troops have killed more than 300 Muslim militants in a battle near Algiers during the last 3 days. No government casualties are reported.

ARGENTINA

March 13—The government introduces a stability package to obtain \$11.1 billion to support the peso; the International Monetary Fund will provide \$2 billion in loans; other funding is to come from local businesses, the World Bank, and the Inter-American Development Bank.

AZERBAIJAN

March 17—President Heydar Aliyev says government forces have put down an attempted coup by a rebel police unit.

BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

March 20—Bosnian government forces break a cease-fire, scheduled to end April 31, by launching attacks on Bosnian Serb militias near Tuzla.

March 21—Bosnian Serb forces shell Tuzla.

March 26—Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic orders the mobilization of all Bosnian Serbs in Serb-controlled Bosnia to counter the current Bosnian government offensive.

BURUNDI

March 11—Mines and Energy Minister Ernest Kabushemeye is assassinated; the minister was a member of the majority Hutu population.

March 17—Three Belgians are among 5 people killed by Hutu extremists in an ambush outside Bujumbura.

March 25—Thousands of people flee Bujumbura to escape fighting between Hutu and Tutsi extremists that broke out 3 days ago; the death toll is thought to range into the hundreds.

CANADA

March 16—Canada releases a Spanish boat it seized March 9 off Newfoundland and accused of illegal fishing. Canada claims that European Union fishing boats, banned from fishing off Europe, are draining its fish stocks.

March 27—A Canadian Coast Guard ship cuts the nets of a Spanish trawler fishing in the Grand Banks, an area Canada has declared off-limits for fishing.

CHINA

March 5—In his opening address to the National People's Congress, Prime Minister Li Peng reports that the annual inflation rate in 1994 was 21.7%, the highest since the Communist Party took power in 1949.

March 13—In Beijing, US and Chinese officials sign an accord under which the US will back China's entry into the World Trade Organization; China agrees to dismantle some trade barriers for American goods.

CROATIA

March 7—The Bosnian and Croatian governments announce a new military alliance to combat Bosnian and Croatian Serbs. Croatia has told the UN to withdraw its 12,000 peacekeepers by March 31; the UN believes today's pact was made to follow a similar Bosnian and Croatian Serb pact announced 2 weeks ago.

March 8—The UN announces it will not provide any emergency food supplies to rebel Serbs in the Krajina region unless they allow UN access to the besieged Muslim-held Bihac pocket and accept a UN deployment on Krajina's border with Croatia.

March 12—President Franjo Tudjman agrees to allow UN forces to operate in Croatia. Under the terms of the agreement, the UN Security Council will mandate 2 separate forces for Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina; the UN deployment in Croatia will be mainly stationed on Croatia's borders.

CUBA

March 13—President Fidel Castro arrives in Paris for 3 days of talks; he meets with French President François Mitterrand.

EGYPT

March 28—Egypt hangs 2 Muslim militants convicted of attempting to murder novelist Naguib Mahfouz last October.

ESTONIA

March 6—Election results released today show that the ruling Fatherland Party received only about 5% of the vote in elections last week; 2 parties calling for slower economic reform, the Coalition Party and the Rural People's Union, won approximately 47% of the vote and will form a new government.

HAITI

March 28—Mireille Durocher Bertin, a lawyer who supported the 1991 coup to unseat President Jean-Bertrand Aristide, is assassinated.

March 29—Aristide condemns the killing of Bertin.

March 31—US President Bill Clinton arrives in Haiti to witness the transfer of Haitian security from the 4,500 US troops currently stationed in Haiti to a multilateral UN force of 6,900.

IRAQ

March 13—*The New York Times* reports that retired Major General Wafiq Samarai attempted a coup against President Saddam Hussein earlier this month; Samarai has reportedly fled to Syria.

March 25—An Iraqi court sentences 2 Americans to 8 years in prison; the men accidentally crossed the border from Kuwait while traveling through the demilitarized zone on March 13.

ISRAEL

March 19—Two settlers are killed and 5 wounded in an ambush by Palestinian gunmen on an Israeli bus in Hebron.

ITALY

March 2—Former Prime Minister Giulio Andreotti is indicted on charges that he provided protection to the mafia in Sicily in return for political support for Andreotti's Christian Democratic Party.

JAPAN

March 20—Eight people are killed and more than 4,700 are hospitalized after nerve gas is released on three lines of the Tokyo subway system.

March 23—Police searching the grounds of the Aum Shinrikyo religious sect find 2 tons of chemicals, some of which are similar to those used in the gas attack on the Tokyo subway system.

March 24—Police discover several more tons of key nerve gas ingredients as they continue searching the properties of the religious sect.

March 29—The Bank of Tokyo and the Mitsubishi Bank announce that they plan to merge; the merger will create the world's largest bank, with \$819 billion in assets.

KAZAKHSTAN

March 11—President Nursultan Nazarbayev dissolves parliament after the Constitutional Court rules that the legislative body was illegitimate because the March 1994 parliamentary elections were flawed.

KOREA, NORTH

March 8—North Korea threatens to break an agreement to freeze its nuclear program; it says it will not accept 2 South Korean-built nuclear reactors as part of a deal brokered last year with the US and several other countries.

LEBANON

March 2—Foreign Minister Faris Bouez asks the UN to halt an Israeli naval blockade of southern Lebanon and stop Israel's bombing of areas in southern Lebanon. Israel began the blockade about 3 weeks ago to protest Lebanese security checks at the border of the Israeli-occupied "security zone" in southern Lebanon.

March 10—Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin announces that Israel has lifted its sea blockade of Lebanon.

MEXICO

March 3—Former President Carlos Salinas ends a 1-day hunger strike to protest President Ernesto Zedillo's remarks that Salinas is primarily responsible for Mexico's current economic crisis.

March 6—The government formally charges Mario Ruiz Massieu, the former deputy attorney general, with covering up the investigation into the 1994 assassination of his brother, Institutional Revolutionary Party leader José Francisco Ruiz Massieu.

March 12—Salinas leaves for indefinite exile in the US; a Zedillo administration emissary requested his departure from Mexico on March 7.

March 14—In an attempt to bring the Zapatista National Liberation Army to the negotiation table, an Interior Ministry official announces that the army will withdraw from positions in the Zapatista rebels' former areas of control in Chiapas.

March 18—The Chamber of Deputies approves a Zedillo plan to stabilize the economy by a vote of 290 to 173. Under the plan there will be a 50% increase in the sales tax; the prices of gasoline and electricity will rise; and increases in the minimum wage will be limited to 10%.

MYANMAR

March 15—State radio announces that the military junta released opposition party leader U Tin Oo and 30 other political prisoners today.

NIGERIA

March 23—The government releases former military leader General Olusegun Obasanjo; he had been arrested in connection with an attempted March 1 coup against the current military leader, General Sani Abacha.

PAKISTAN

March 8—In Karachi, unidentified gunmen kill 2 American diplomats and injure a third in an attack on a van carrying the 3 to work at the United States consulate in that city; no one takes responsibility for the killings.

March 10—Gunmen open fire on a Shiite Muslim mosque in Karachi after a bomb explodes at the mosque; 11 people are killed and at least 22 wounded.

March 12—Acting on Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto's orders to end violence in Karachi, police round up more than 300 suspected militants.

PALESTINIAN NATIONAL AUTHORITY

March 12—A World Bank-administered fund for the Authority has run out of money, *The New York Times* reports, because

donors who pledged \$60 million in aid in November have only delivered \$36 million; the Israeli denial of Palestinian workers' entry into Israel last month following terrorist attacks has also depleted the Authority's tax base.

PERU

March 1—Peru and Ecuador agree to a cease-fire; a previous cease-fire was broken with the resumption of heavy fighting last week. In 1 month of fighting over a contested border area ceded to Peru in 1942, 73 soldiers have been killed and 200 wounded; about 10,000 soldiers are massed on the border. Under the terms of the new cease-fire, the US, Argentina, Brazil, and Chile are to send peacekeepers to monitor troop withdrawals from the border area next week.

PHILIPPINES

March 21—Protests continue throughout the country in response to the execution in Singapore last week of a Filipina accused of murder; President Fidel Ramos appeals for calm, and the Singaporean embassy issues a formal protest over the public burning of the Singaporean flag.

RUSSIA

March 1—Vladislav Listyev, a popular television journalist who also served as executive director of the Ostankino television network, is killed in Moscow; the killing is believed to have been carried out by organized crime elements.

March 6—The military says it has gained total control of Grozny, the capital of the breakaway republic of Chechnya; Russian troops have been fighting in the republic for the last 3 months.

President Boris Yeltsin dismisses the chief of police and the chief prosecutor in Moscow for not aggressively combating organized crime.

March 9—Yeltsin announces that the government will allow the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe to establish a permanent human rights mission in Chechnya.

March 10—The government reaches an agreement with the IMF on the terms for a \$6.4 billion standby loan.

March 31—The military announces that Russian forces have captured the last urban center under guerrilla control in Chechnya.

RWANDA

March 20—UN officials in Nairobi say that 24 Rwandans who had been charged in connection with the genocide in Rwanda last year suffocated to death in a jail cell in Kigali last week.

SOMALIA

March 2—US Marines complete a 3-day mission to assist in the withdrawal of the remaining UN troops in Somalia; the withdrawal marks the end of a \$2 billion UN mission to end famine in the country and restore a stable government.

SOUTH AFRICA

March 27—President Nelson Mandela dismisses his estranged wife, Winnie, from the Cabinet for insubordination.

TURKEY

March 20—Turkish forces attack bases belonging to the rebel Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) in northern Iraq; the 2,800

guerrillas of the PKK, based in Iraq, have been fighting Turkey for a Kurdish homeland since 1984.

UKRAINE

March 1—Prime Minister Vitaly Masol resigns; First Deputy Prime Minister Yevhen Marchuk is named prime minister.

UNITED KINGDOM

Great Britain

March 14—The government announces that it will withdraw 400 troops from Northern Ireland; at least 18,000 British soldiers are still stationed in the province.

Northern Ireland

March 8—For the first time, Sinn Fein, the political arm of the Irish Republican Army, says it will discuss the issue of IRA disarmament with the British government.

UNITED STATES

March 1—President Bill Clinton issues an executive order to reduce the US stockpile of highly enriched uranium and plutonium by 200 tons.

March 8—The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) reports that Bosnian Serbs are responsible for 90% of the ethnic cleansing in Bosnia since 1991.

March 12—Vice President Gore, speaking at a UN conference on poverty in Copenhagen, announces that over the next 5 years the US will begin to channel 40 percent of its foreign aid packages through nongovernmental organizations rather than through governments.

March 22—Representative Robert G. Torricelli (D-N.J.) reports that Guatemalan Colonel Julio Roberto Alpírez, who was responsible for the 1992 torture and death of Efraín Bamaca Velásquez, a Guatemalan guerrilla leader, and the 1990 killing of Michael DeVine, an American hotelier in Guatemala, was receiving payments from the CIA at the time of the deaths and that the CIA knew the details of the deaths.

March 29—*The New York Times* reports that Bush and Clinton administration officials have said that the Bush administration, which publicly ceased military aid to Guatemala in 1990 in response to the killing of DeVine, allowed the CIA to send between \$5 million and \$7 million to Guatemala after the aid cutoff.

March 30—Clinton orders an investigation into US activities in Guatemala.

VENEZUELA

March 15—More than 150 leftists have been arrested and accused of plotting an uprising for March 16; authorities believe the Revolutionary Bolivarian Movement planned violent demonstrations to protest 20% price increases announced last month.

March 17—More than 1,000 Colombian illegal immigrants living on the Colombia-Venezuela border are forcibly deported to Colombia; the deportation comes after a Colombian guerrilla raid last month that killed 8 soldiers. Venezuela has recently placed 5,000 troops in 4 states bordering Colombia, while Colombia has put 5,700 troops on its side of the border. ■

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
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